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Abstract
This paper examines a detailed dataset on open market repurchase announcements
and actual repurchases conducted by Norwegian ﬁrms during the period 1998-2001.
Firms that announce a repurchase plan experience a positive excess return around the
announcement date. However, these ﬁrms also experience an abnormal performance
after the announcement, suggesting that the market underreacts to the positive signal
conveyed through the announcement. When examining the sample of actual repur-
chases, we ﬁnd that there is a positive price impact around the execution dates,
indicating that the market puts a positive value on the information conveyed through
the actual repurchases. In the long run, only announcing ﬁrms that do not repurchase
experience a signiﬁcant positive abnormal performance, while a portfolio tracking the
repurchasing ﬁrms perform according to expectations. In addition, announcing ﬁrms
that do not repurchase are less liquid than repurchasing ﬁrms. One suggested explana-
tion for the ﬁnding is that ﬁrms by executing repurchases mitigate the undervaluation
by conﬁrming their initial signal through actual transactions such that these ﬁrms
perform as expected in the long run. Due to the lower liquidity of non-repurchasing
ﬁrms, they are likely to be constrained from exploiting mispricing and unable to signal
undervaluation to the market. If this is the case, the price remains too low, and in-
formation surprises in later periods contribute to the long term abnormal return drift
for these companies.
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11 Introduction
Corporations distribute an increasingly larger amount of their cash to shareholders through
repurchases relative to cash dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that, in the US,
expenditures on share repurchase programs relative to total earnings increased from 4.8%
in 1980 to 41.8% in 2000. Moreover, they also report that the number of ﬁrms repur-
chasing shares as a fraction of ﬁrms initiating a cash distribution increased from 26.6% in
1972 to 82% in 2000, and that US ﬁrms used as much money on repurchases as on cash
dividends in 2000. This result suggests that share repurchases has become the preferred
payout method for many ﬁrms in the US. Also outside the US, in e.g. Canada, France,
Australia and the UK, there has been a growth in the repurchase activity. In recent years
several countries where repurchases previously were prohibited now allow ﬁrms to repur-
chase their own shares. Among these countries is Norway, where share repurchases were
allowed from 1999. The main objective of this paper is to provide a detailed examination
of the open market repurchase activity among Norwegian ﬁrms from 1999 through 2001.
Furthermore, we examine whether an announcement eﬀect and support for the underre-
action hypothesis in Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) is found in the Norwegian data. The
underreaction hypothesis states that the market treats the announcement of an open mar-
ket share repurchase program with scepticism, incompletely reacting to the information
conveyed through the announcement such that prices adjust slowly over time. One reason
for this slow adjustment may be that information is incorporated into prices at later points
in time when the ﬁrm disclose new information to the market. In line with results for other
countries, we ﬁnd that announcing ﬁrms experience a positive announcement eﬀect, and
a long run drift in abnormal returns in the same direction as the announcement eﬀect
relative to several model speciﬁcations.
Due to the strict disclosure rules in Norway, we are also able to study the price eﬀect
of actual repurchases at a daily level. By combining the announcement and repurchase
data, we investigate whether the abnormal performance after announcements of repurchase
programs depend on the repurchase activity of announcing ﬁrms. The motivation for this is
that if the market treats the initial announcement with skepticism, the actual repurchases
may be a more credible signal about undervaluation since it involves real transactions by
the ﬁrm. Thus, the actual repurchase may conﬁrm the initial signal such that the market
adjust prices closer to the true value in response to the actual repurchases.
Our results provide additional insight into the long term performance of announcing
ﬁrms. The ﬁndings suggest that the abnormal performance of announcing ﬁrms as a
group, to a large degree is related to ﬁrms that do not execute any repurchases after
they have announced. In addition, the results suggest that liquidity constraints may
restrict these ﬁrms from executing repurchases. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that
these ﬁrms experience excess returns when information is revealed to the market through
public information surprises in later periods, and that they are unable to conﬁrm their
initial signal through actual repurchases. On the other hand, the ﬁrms that actually
repurchase shares, may successfully conﬁrm their initial signal of undervaluation through
real transactions such that subsequent returns (after the ﬁrst repurchase) fall to expected
levels. If this is the case, requiring ﬁrms to report their repurchase activity in a timely
fashion, as in Norway, may help improve price discovery and eﬃciency. An alternative
interpretation of the result may also be that ﬁrms that actually repurchase shares are
expected to do so. In other words, these companies may be those that successfully (and
most credibly) are able to signal that they are undervalued through the announcement
2such that they are no longer undervalued after the announcement. However, we would not
expect these ﬁrms to repurchase shares for undervaluation reasons after the announcement.
In addition, we do not ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerent announcement eﬀect for
announcements that result in subsequent repurchases and those that do not.
Overall, in addition to providing evidence on open market share repurchases in a
market where repurchases has recently been allowed, we believe that repurchases in Norway
are particularly interesting to study due to the legal requirement that ﬁrms report their
repurchase activity on a daily basis. By exploiting these unique data, we provide new
evidence with respect to open market repurchases, and how the market reacts to the
actual repurchase executions.
Why ﬁrms choose to repurchase shares has gained a lot of attention, especially in the
US which has the longest history of repurchases. At a general level, a repurchase is merely
an alternative way of paying out cash to shareholders. Initially, whether a ﬁrm chooses one
payout method over the other should not matter for ﬁrm value, and hence the shareholders
of the ﬁrm. In a perfect world with no frictions or information asymmetries, whether the
ﬁrm chooses to pay out some of its cash pro rata through dividends, or use the same cash
to buy shares back from some shareholders should not aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm because
a buyback reduces assets in a way that oﬀsets the reduced number of shares with cash
ﬂow rights, and should leave the price for the remaining stocks unaﬀected. In addition,
since investors allocate their funds relative to their preferences and risk tolerances, any
changes in the payout policy of the ﬁrm can be oﬀset by portfolio rebalancing. How-
ever, several studies (e.g. Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry et al.
(1995), Ikenberry et al. (2000)) ﬁnd that ﬁrms announcing a repurchase plan experience
an abnormal price increase around the announcement, indicating that the announcement
must have some economical beneﬁts to shareholders. This is not surprising in the sense
that we know that information asymmetries are important with respect to the pricing of
assets and that actions by the ﬁrm (e.g. payout announcements) may help the market
extract enough information to move the price closer to the full information value (Miller
and Rock, 1985).
The literature on repurchases provides a vast amount of suggestions for why one should
expect a positive announcement eﬀect. However, one of the most prevalent hypotheses,
which is the main topic of this paper, is the signalling hypothesis discussed in e.g. Vermae-
len (1981, 1984). The signalling hypothesis assumes that there is asymmetric information
between the managers and the market, and that the initiation of a repurchase plan is a
positive signal about the value of the ﬁrm that the market yet has failed to incorporate
into prices. If the managers of a ﬁrm have better information about the current earnings
and future prospects of the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm is priced too low relative to their informa-
tion set, they can convey this to the market by announcing a repurchase plan. In short,
a repurchase announcement indicates that the ﬁrm’s managers believe that the stock is
trading below fair value, such that the stock price should rise as the market reacts to the
new earnings information that it infers from the signal.1 The motivation for managers to
initiate a repurchase plan may be to increase the market value of the ﬁrm to avoid costs
of undervaluation (such as e.g. reduce the probability of takeover which could replace
the managers). If the signalling hypothesis is true, and markets are semistrong eﬃcient,
the announcement of a repurchase plan should induce the market to quickly correct the
1In the early literature there is also a negative signal interpretation of stock repurchases which argue
that a repurchase is a signal that the ﬁrm does not have any proﬁtable investment opportunities.
3mispricing. To assess the market valuation of the repurchase signal, the price impact of
repurchase announcements has been studied across several countries and time periods.
The results in Vermaelen (1981), Dann (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Stephens
and Weisbach (1998), Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) among others, ﬁnd support for the
signalling hypothesis in that there is a signiﬁcant positive abnormal return of about 2%
around the announcement date.2
Although the signalling hypothesis is the most frequently mentioned explanation for
why ﬁrms announce repurchase programs, and the observed announcement eﬀect, there
is also a vast amount of other explanations which will be discussed in more detail in
section 2. Among these are capital structure adjustments (Vermaelen, 1981; Opler and
Titman, 1996), disgorgement of excess cash (Jensen, 1986; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998;
Jagannathan et al., 2000), substitution for cash dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002),
takeover defense (Denis, 1990; Bagwell, 1991; Dittmar, 2000), shareholder expropriation
(Brennan and Thakor, 1990), to counter the dilution eﬀects of employee and management
options (Fenn and Liang, 1997), personal taxes (Masulis, 1980; Lie and Lie, 1999; Grullon
and Michaely, 2002) and manipulating EPS ﬁgures (Bens et al., 2002).
Although, support for the signalling hypothesis has been found for many markets and
time periods, one puzzle is that the market seems to underreact to the announcement
signal. This lines up with an emerging body of empirical literature suggesting that the
market underreacts to new information about ﬁrms cash ﬂows. Events that are likely to
contain relevant information about current or future cash ﬂow, such as earnings surprises,
dividend initiations and omissions, as well as the announcements of repurchase plans, are
followed by an abnormal stock-price drift in the same direction as the initial announcement
return. For repurchase announcements, this is documented by Ikenberry et al. (1995) for
the US, and for Canada by Ikenberry et al. (2000). Initially, if the market eﬃciently, and in
an unbiased fashion, adjusts the price as a response to the announcement signal, these ﬁrms
should not experience an abnormal performance following the announcement. However,
both studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms announcing an open market repurchase plan experience a
positive drift in abnormal return in the long run (up to 4 years) after the announcement.
This ﬁnding suggests that the market underreacts to the initial signal by ignoring a large
part of the signal value. In other words, the observed positive price adjustment around the
repurchase announcement is not suﬃcient to correct the mispricing. In Ikenberry et al.
(1995) the market’s valuation of the signal conveyed through the repurchase announcement
is about 3.5% while a portfolio of the same ﬁrms experience a risk adjusted performance
of 12.1% the years following the announcement.
However, one problem with the signalling hypothesis is that, in the case of open mar-
ket repurchases, the announcement of a repurchase plan is not a commitment from the
ﬁrm to repurchase shares. Furthermore, as argued in Comment and Jarrell (1991), the
announcement of an open market repurchase plan is a weak signal since it does not impose
any costs to the manager if it is false. Thus, the apparent underreaction observed for open
market repurchases may be a rational reaction (as opposed to an irrational underreaction)
2Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995) ﬁnd an announcement eﬀect in the US of 2.3%
(for the period 1985-1988) and 3.5% (1980-1990) respectively. In addition Comment and Jarrell (1991)
examine Dutch auction repurchases and tender oﬀer repurchases, which have a 11% and 8% price impact
respectively. They argue that tender oﬀer repurchases have the strongest signalling ability of the three.
For Canada, Li and McNally (2002) ﬁnd a announcement eﬀect of 0.9% (for the period 1995-1999). Lasfer
(2000) ﬁnd the eﬀect to be 1.64% in the UK, 1% for continental Europe, 0.78% in France and 0.63% for
Italy over the period 1985 to 1998.
4since the signalling power of the announcement is weak. Moreover, the market is unable
to distinguish truly undervalued ﬁrms from falsely signalling ﬁrms, and treat the signal
with skepticism. On the other hand, if managers owns shares in the ﬁrm and commit
themselves to retaining their shares during the repurchase period, the power of the signal
would be stronger.3 Such commitments are rarely observed for open market repurchases.
However, as discussed by Comment and Jarrell (1991), one type of repurchase where man-
agers often pre-commit to retaining their shares are tender oﬀer repurchases. In these
cases, a false signal would be more costly to the manager since it would reduce his wealth
if the ﬁrm distributes cash to tendering shareholders above the true value. Their ﬁndings
support this as tender oﬀer repurchases experience a much stronger announcement eﬀect
than open market repurchases.
Further, tender oﬀer repurchases are generally for larger volumes than open market
repurchases, and the repurchases are executed very close in time to the announcement.
Thus, there is no uncertainty with respect to whether the ﬁrm will repurchase or not. In
the case of open market repurchases, on the other hand, the actual repurchases may occur
a long time after the announcement, if at all. Since actual repurchase executions reﬂect
real transactions, they potentially reduce the manager’s wealth if he has a stake in the
company, retains his shares and execute repurchases when the ﬁrm is overvalued. Thus, it
is plausible that an actual repurchase may constitute a stronger signal (or a conﬁrmation
of the initial signal) of undervaluation than the initial announcement. This is one of the
issues we will investigate in this paper. An additional motivation for studying the actual
repurchases in detail is a survey in Institutional Investor (1998), which notes that less than
one quarter of the companies that had announced a repurchase plan during a speciﬁc period
in the US had actually completed the amount that they announced that they intended to
repurchase. Furthermore, as discussed by Stephens and Weisbach (1998), an issue that has
not been addressed in the academic literature, but has been a concern among practitioners
and the popular press, is that the actual repurchase activity among ﬁrms that announce
a repurchase plan is small relative to what the intention is at announcement.4 A concern
that has been raised in the popular press is that the announcement of a repurchase plan
is a way for the management to raise the stock price at little or no cost in the short
run. In fact, Kracher and Johnson (1997) argue that many ﬁrms in the US announce
repurchase plans with no intention of repurchasing. One of their arguments is that since
the reporting standards in the US, with respect to open market repurchases, are very
loose, it is diﬃcult for investors to actually know whether announcing ﬁrms under normal
circumstances are actually going through with the repurchase plan. Their main suggestion
is that US ﬁrms should be required to report the progress of the repurchase plan such that
they are motivated to only announce a repurchase plan when their intentions are true.
Interestingly, this is exactly the case for Norwegian ﬁrms, in that they are required by
law to report their repurchases within the same trading day or before the trading session
starts the next day.
This brings us back to the main topic of this paper. If the market is concerned with
the announcements of repurchase plans being false signals due to the lack of commitment
to actually repurchase, it is interesting to examine whether the actual repurchases are
3However, managers rarely commit to retaining their shares during the repurchase period such that
they may also use the repurchases to sell their own shares at a high price (Fried, 2002).
4They refer to two articles in The Wall Street Journal (March 7, 1995) and Fortune (September 4,
1995). More recent articles expressing the same concern are articles in Fortune (September 8, 1997) and
Forbes (June 21, 2001).
5perceived by the market as valuable information, conﬁrming the ﬁrms’s initial intentions.
It may be that requiring ﬁrms to report their repurchase activity help improve price
discovery and price eﬃciency when there is asymmetric information between the managers
of the ﬁrm and the market. Especially if the ﬁrm is unable to convey this information
through explicit announcements.
The paper has three contributions to the existing literature. First, we examine the
announcement eﬀect and long-term performance of repurchasing ﬁrms in a market where
repurchases recently have been allowed. The paper provides a descriptive examination
of the growth of repurchases in Norway for the period 1999 through 2001, and examines
whether an announcement eﬀect and a long term abnormal performance (underreaction)
is observed for Norwegian ﬁrms that announce a repurchase program.
The second contribution is that we are able to examine the actual repurchase activity of
announcing ﬁrms. While the literature to a large extent has focused on the announcements
of repurchase plans, we examine in more detail the market reaction to actual repurchases
transactions on a daily frequency as well. Due to the diﬃculty in measuring actual re-
purchases in the US5 only a few studies examine the actual repurchase activity of ﬁrms.
Notable exceptions are Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan et al. (2000), Dittmar
(2000), Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Chan et al. (2003).6 However, since these papers only
have access to monthly, quarterly and annual data, and use noisy measures of the actual
repurchase activity (for the US) they are unable to examine in detail any price eﬀects and
the timing of these repurchases in the short term. Thus, by exploiting detailed information
on actual repurchases we are able study the timing of repurchase executions and the price
eﬀect around these repurchases on a daily frequency. Moreover, we are able to exam-
ine whether the repurchases represent trading opportunities/undervaluations exploited by
the managers of these ﬁrms, and whether the market perceives the repurchase as a signal
about ﬁrm value. In a related paper by Stephens and Weisbach (1998), they examine the
determinants of actual repurchases during the repurchase period and ﬁnd that managers
repurchase more shares when the stock price falls and that ﬁrms adjust their repurchase
activity to their cash position.
The third contribution of the paper is to combine the announcement and actual repur-
chase data to examine wether the long run performance of ﬁrms that actually repurchase
shares is diﬀerent from ﬁrms that do not repurchase any shares.
The empirical section of the paper consists of four main parts. The ﬁrst part provides
a description of the repurchase activity among Norwegian ﬁrms during the ﬁrst three
years that repurchases were allowed in Norway.7 The second part examines whether the
empirical regularities (announcement eﬀect and long term positive excess performance)
found in other studies (especially in the US and Canada) also are evident in the Norwegian
data. The third part of the paper examines whether the performance of ﬁrms that actually
repurchase are diﬀerent from announcing ﬁrms that do not. The fourth part of the paper
examines in more detail the price impact and timing of actual repurchases. Before we
present the results we will in the next section go through the empirical and theoretical
literature on repurchases in more detail to review the proposed reasons for why one should
5Due to the loose reporting requirements of repurchases in the US, previous studies have to rely on
estimating the repurchase activity based on ﬁnancial statements or other data sources.
6In a recent paper by Brockman and Chung (2004) they exploit a similar dataset as examined in this
paper from Hong Kong where the disclosure requirements are similar as in Norway.
7Note that ﬁrms were allowed to announce repurchase programs before 1999, but were not allowed to
execute any repurchases before 1999.
6expect a positive price impact at the announcement. In section 3 we give an overview of
the institutional and regulatory aspects of repurchases in Norway. In section 4 we discuss
the dataset, and explain the empirical methodology in section 5 before the results from
the various analyzes are presented in section 6 and a summary is provided in section 7.
2 Theoretical predictions
The decision taken by the ﬁrms to initiate a repurchase program is a strategic choice be-
tween debt and equity as well as a choice of how much dividend to pay out. In a Miller and
Modigliani (1961) setting where capital markets are perfect, this choice does not matter for
the value of the ﬁrm. However, as the perfect market assumption is relaxed, one gains the
insight that capital market imperfections and taxes are important determinants of corpo-
rate ﬁnancial policies. Although this study mainly focuses on the signalling hypothesis, we
also review some of the most commonly proposed hypotheses aimed at explaining the price
impact and its direction with respect to repurchase announcements. Many of the hypothe-
ses are not mutually exclusive, and most of the hypotheses predict a positive price impact.
Asymmetric information explanations
The traditional signalling hypothesis is motivated by asymmetric information between the
managers of a ﬁrm and the market place. Since managers through their positions in the
ﬁrm are expected to have important private information, they, based on their information
set, may assess the true value of the ﬁrm to be diﬀerent than the current market valuation.
It is important to note that this relates to information that is not easy or impossible
to convey to the market through a public disclosure. For example, the company may
not want to explicitly disclose the information for competitive reasons or because it is
constrained by conﬁdentiality agreements. This information may both indicate that the
current market valuation is above or below what the manager perceives as the true value
of the ﬁrm. The motivation for managers to initiate a repurchase plan may be to increase
the market value of the ﬁrm to avoid costs of undervaluation (e.g. reduce the probability of
takeover which could replace the management team). Vermaelen (1981), Dann (1981) and
Comment and Jarrell (1991) among others, argue that the announcement of a repurchase
plan is a valuable signal to the less informed marketplace about undervaluation because
the managers of a ﬁrm potentially know more about the future prospects of the ﬁrm,
current earnings and current investment opportunities. Thus, a repurchase is a vehicle for
communicating valuable information to shareholders and the market, and is perceived by
investors as a signal of management’s assessment of company value. Furthermore, in Brav
et al. (2003), managers often mention undervaluation as an important motive for why
they repurchase shares. As a consequence, the observed stock-price increase around the
announcement of a repurchase program is often interpreted as support for the signalling
hypothesis. Alternatively, a repurchase announcement may also be interpreted by the
market as if the ﬁrm does not have any proﬁtable use of its internally generated funds.
Thus, the direction of this signal may be ambiguous, but is most commonly hypothesized
to be positive.
However, there are a few sensitive issues with respect to the signalling hypothesis,
especially with respect to open market repurchase announcements. First, for a signal about
undervaluation to be credible, it needs to impose substantial costs on the manager. If
7managers could commit to retaining their shares through the repurchase period, as well as
committing the ﬁrm to actually execute repurchases, the credibility of the signal would be
stronger the greater the ownership of the manager or other primary insiders. Through such
commitments, it would be costly to the manager if the ﬁrm initiates a repurchase program
when the ﬁrm is overvalued since the repurchase would increase the managers ownership
in the overvalued ﬁrm. However, since ﬁrms seldom commit to actually repurchasing
any shares (unless in the case of tender oﬀer repurchases), and managers rarely commit
themselves to retaining their own shares through the repurchase period, the credibility of
the open market repurchase announcement may be questionable.
As discussed in Fried (2002), there is a theoretical inconsistency with respect to the
signalling hypothesis in the sense that it requires managers to sacriﬁce their own wealth
to increase that of shareholders. If managers act opportunistically, Fried (2002) argues
that they will use open market share repurchases in two situations. First, they do not
use repurchases to signal undervaluation, but rather initiate repurchases when the ﬁrm
is undervalued with the motivation of transferring wealth to themselves (and the remain-
ing shareholders). This, however, is still consistent with the signalling hypothesis since
the market will observe the repurchase announcement (and subsequent repurchases) and
interpret this as the ﬁrm being undervalued. Moreover, while the signalling hypothesis
predicts that managers attempt to credibly communicate that the stock is underpriced, the
managerial opportunism theory predicts that managers try not to reveal that the stock
is underpriced. However, this may be diﬃcult or even impossible since repurchases, at
least in Norway, are observable (the day after the repurchase) to the rest of the market.8
In the US on the other had, the ﬁrm is not required to report their repurchase activity,
such that it would be easier for the the manager to repurchase shares without revealing
this to the market. Furthermore, Fried (2002) argues that the second situation in which
opportunistic managers announce a repurchase plan is when they want to sell their own
shares.
A model that directly addresses the credibility issue related to open market share
repurchase announcements is Isagawa (2000). In that model, the credibility of the an-
nouncement is restored when the manager’s monetary compensation depends on the future
stock price (either through share-ownership or options). Whether the manager chooses to
invest free cash in an unproﬁtable project or not depends on the private beneﬁts to the
manager. Moreover, if the private beneﬁt of investing in the unproﬁtable project (and
decreasing the ﬁrm value) is smaller than the monetary compensation from increased ﬁrm
value, he will repurchase shares instead of investing in the unproﬁtable project. Thus, the
announcement of the repurchase program conveys information about the managers private
beneﬁts and signals to the market that the manager is committed not to waste cash on
unproﬁtable projects. Thus, in ﬁrms where the manager has a high ownership stake or
options, the announcement of a repurchase plan may be a credible signal to the market.
In this model, the manager does not signal undervaluation, but rather convey information
that agency costs of free cash is less likely to occur.
Another theoretical contribution related to asymmetric information between the ﬁrm
and the market is a paper by Barclay and Smith (1988) who argue that the implicit costs
of trading the stock in the market increases after the ﬁrm has announced a repurchase
plan. The main motivation of their model is to explain why ﬁrms in the US distribute
8Fried (2002) does not discuss another alternative in which an opportunistic manager instead buys
undervalued shares on his own account without initiating a repurchase plan.
8more cash through dividends relative to repurchases despite the tax beneﬁt of repurchases
relative to dividends. Their main argument is that the adverse selection component of
the bid ask spread increases due to the increased probability of trading with an informed
investor, the ﬁrm. The wider spread raises the required rate of return, reduces corporate
investments and lowers ﬁrm value. Because of this they argue that ﬁrms prefer to use
dividends to pay out cash. The early literature on repurchases in the US was puzzled
by the fact that so few ﬁrms repurchased shares. However, later years there has been a
large increase in cash distributed through share repurchases relative to dividends in the
US (Grullon and Michaely, 2002).
In a model by Brennan and Thakor (1990), they argue that diﬀerent incentives of be-
coming informed among shareholders, when information gathering is costly, is important
when ﬁrms decide to repurchase shares. They argue that share repurchases causes a wealth
redistribution from small, uninformed, shareholders to large, informed shareholders. The
main assumption is that information gathering is costly, inducing only large shareholders
to becoming informed. Thus, informed investors are able to bid for undervalued stocks
and avoid over-valued ones. Since the small investors are unable to condition their trading
on the trading of the better informed investors, they will be left with a higher stake in
overvalued ﬁrms and a lower stake in undervalued ﬁrms. Since dividends do not have
this problem because they are pro-rata, the Brennan and Thakor (1990) model predicts
that large shareholders will prefer cash to be distributed through repurchases, while small
investors prefer cash dividends. Thus, an implication of their model is that the choice
of cash distribution method depends on the ownership composition in the ﬁrm, and that
ﬁrms with high ownership concentration would be more likely to use repurchases.
Free cash-ﬂow hypothesis
As discussed in Jensen (1986), repurchases is an alternative to increasing dividends, or
issue new debt, to pay out excess cash to mitigate agency costs of free cash.9 In line with
the suggestions in Jensen (1986), both Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Dittmar (2000) and
Jagannathan et al. (2000), among others, ﬁnd that ﬁrms in fact use repurchases to pay out
cash ﬂows that have a low probability of being sustainable, while dividend increases reﬂect
higher expected permanent cash ﬂows. Moreover, since ﬁrms seem to smooth dividends,
and are reluctant to reducing dividends (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2003), a repurchase is
a way for ﬁrms with volatile cash ﬂows to distribute temporary cash without increasing
dividends. Thus, since a repurchase may mitigate agency costs of free cash, one would
expect a positive price impact from a repurchase announcement. In addition, as discussed
earlier, in ﬁrms where the manager has an ownership in the ﬁrm, the announcement of a
repurchase plan may be a credible signal that the manager does not want to waste free
cash on unproﬁtable projects (Isagawa, 2000).
Personal taxes
The personal tax hypothesis argues that ﬁrms repurchase their own shares so that the
9As deﬁned by Jensen (1986), free cash ﬂow is the remaining cash within a ﬁrm after all projects with
positive net present values have been funded. Alternative ways of reducing the agency cost of free cash
ﬂow is through e.g. new debt, dividends or repurchases. Debt is the most credible method to counter the
free cash ﬂow agency problems since it is a binding commitment whereas repurchase announcements and
dividend increases are not.
9shareholders can beneﬁt from the tax advantage of a repurchase, which (in the US) is
taxed at capital gains rates, relative to dividends, that are taxed at higher ordinary in-
come tax rates. Thus, if the cash payout is kept ﬁxed, personal taxes are reduced if the
ﬁrm uses repurchases instead of dividends to distribute cash. This argument implies that
the announcement should have a positive eﬀect on the stock price due to the relative
tax advantage to shareholders. However, there are several problems with this hypothesis.
First, for the US, the tax diﬀerential is not necessarily the main explanation due to the
US tax code which states that repurchases only qualify as capital gains if the distribution
is essentially not equivalent to paying dividend. Thus, if the repurchase program is of
the same magnitude and at the same frequency as dividend payments, the repurchase is
not classiﬁed as capital gains, but instead taxed at ordinary income tax rates. On the
other hand, as mentioned by Allen and Michaely (2003), they are not aware of any cases
where the IRS has taxed a repurchase as ordinary income. Secondly, studies from coun-
tries where there is no tax advantage to repurchases, ﬁnd a positive announcement eﬀect
of the same magnitude as in the US. Thirdly, Black and Scholes (1974) argue that in
an equilibrium where companies have adjusted their payout policies to match the payout
policies demanded by investors with diﬀerent tax schedules, a further adjustment in pay-
out policy should not aﬀect the stock price. Finally, results in Brav et al. (2003) suggest
that the relative taxation of capital gains and dividends is unimportant when mangers
choose between dividends and repurchases. Thus, the predicted eﬀect of the personal tax
argument is not clear, and empirical results do not show strong support for it.10
Leverage hypothesis
Another explanation for the announcement eﬀect is that the repurchase can be ﬁnanced
by an issue of debt. The leverage argument is that due to the tax subsidy from interest
payments, and that a part of this subsidy is passed on to the shareholders, the price of
the stock is expected to rise in connection to the repurchase. Thus, the ﬁrm will exploit
the beneﬁts of higher leverage by altering its capital structure and this will aﬀect the
value of the ﬁrm and the wealth of the remaining shareholders. Repurchases may also be
used to obtain an optimal leverage ratio. As discussed in e.g. Vermaelen (1981) and Opler
and Titman (1996), repurchases are used by ﬁrms to reduce their equity and increase the
leverage ratio. When ﬁrms are below their target ratio, ﬁrms are more likely to repurchase
stock. A related hypothesis is the bondholder expropriation hypothesis discussed in Dann
(1981), where a repurchase reduces the assets of the company in such a way that the value
of the claims of the bondholders is reduced. Thus, if this potential expropriation of the
bondholders has not been taken into account in the pricing of the bond issues, there will
be a wealth transfer from bondholders to the stockholders of the ﬁrm.
Takeover defense
A repurchase may also be used by a ﬁrm as a defensive payout in response to hostile
takeover attempts. Denis (1990) examine defensive changes in corporate payout policy11
for a sample of ﬁrms in the US. The main ﬁnding is that repurchases is an eﬀective
device for countering hostile takeovers, as there is a high probability of the target ﬁrm
10Much of the earlier literature on repurchases in the US were motivated by the puzzle that despite the
relative tax advantage of repurchases to dividends, ﬁrms preferred dividends as the main payout method.
11Denis (1990) examine defensive share repurchases and special dividends.
10maintaining independence.12 The eﬀect of a ﬁrm announcing a defensive repurchase is
highly negative which suggests that defensive repurchases are associated with losses for
the shareholders of the target ﬁrm. This in the sense that defensive repurchases reduce the
probability that there will be a valuable restructuring within the ﬁrm that could lead to a
more eﬃcient use of ﬁrm resources. Bagwell (1991) proposes a model with heterogenous
valuations among current shareholders and an upward sloping supply curve for for the
company shares. A repurchase removes current shareholders with the lowest valuations
such that a more expensive pool of shareholders are left. Also Bagnoli and Lipman (1989)
propose a model where there is asymmetric information between the manager and the
marketplace, and that repurchases convince current shareholders that the ﬁrm value is
higher, revising their price upwards, such that a takeover attempt becomes more costly
for the bidder.
Other hypotheses
There are also several other hypotheses that aim at explaining why ﬁrms repurchase shares
as well as the positive price eﬀect associated with (non defensive) repurchase announce-
ments. Dittmar (2000) ﬁnd evidence that repurchases are used to counter the dilution
eﬀect of management- and employee options, while Fenn and Liang (1997, 2001) ﬁnd
evidence that repurchases are used to increase the value of such stock options and that
the increase in management stock options may explain the increased use of repurchases.
Bens et al. (2002) argue that repurchases are used to increase earnings per share (EPS)
ﬁgures and Grullon and Michaely (2002) ﬁnd evidence that dividends are substituted for
repurchases due to several of the issues discussed above.
3 Repurchases in Norway
3.1 Repurchase methods
There are mainly three methods for ﬁrms to repurchase their own shares; through tender
oﬀers (ﬁxed price oﬀers), open market transactions or via Dutch auction repurchases.
The two ﬁrst methods are used to a larger extent than the latter, and in the US, open
market transactions are observed more frequently than tender oﬀers. In fact, 90% of the
cases between 1985 and 1993 were open market transactions as discussed in Ikenberry
et al. (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). Open market repurchase programs,
where there is an upper limit on how much shares the company can repurchase, are often
referred to as “Normal Course Issuer Bids”, whereas ﬁxed price tender oﬀers which do
not have any limit to the amount of stock that can be repurchased is commonly called
“Substantial Issuer Bids”. In a tender oﬀer, the reacquiring ﬁrm oﬀers to repurchase a
fraction of its shares at a speciﬁc price, usually at a premium to the market price. In
an open market repurchase, on the other hand, the purchase is executed through brokers
in the open market at normal commissions rates, and no premium is paid.13 Thus, open
12Those ﬁrms that remain independent show a signiﬁcantly lower abnormal returns after the takeover
attempt than those that were successful takeovers.
13At least no direct premium is paid. As argued by Barclay and Smith (1988), the announcement of a
repurchase plan may lead to increased implicit transaction costs in the market due to an increased adverse
selection component in the spread. Thus, by announcing a repurchase plan, the ﬁrm itself may experience
higher trading costs in the primary market.
11market repurchases may be viewed as a sequence of tender oﬀer repurchases, where the bid
price of the order is the tender price. Since tender oﬀers are generally larger in magnitude
than open market repurchases, the alternative of trading the shares directly in the market
may induce a price impact to the ﬁrm that would exceed the premium oﬀered through the
tender price. With respect to Dutch auction repurchases, the repurchasing ﬁrm set a range
of prices at which it is willing to repurchase shares. Then, each shareholder informs the
ﬁrm of their supply at these price levels. When all price schedules are collected, the ﬁrm
has an aggregate supply curve, and chooses the lowest price that will ﬁll their demand,
and the transactions are executed at this clearing price.
The 1st of January, 1999, the Securities Act of June 13 1997 (Aksjeloven) went into
eﬀect, and Norwegian ﬁrms were allowed to repurchase their own shares. The Securities
Act states that ﬁrms are not allowed to hold more than 10% of their issued shares at any
point in time. In addition, the ﬁrm’s total equity value in excess of the ﬁrm’s own stock-
holdings must at all times be higher than NOK 1 mill. For a company to be able to initiate
a repurchase plan, it requires 2/3 of the voting shares represented at the shareholder
meeting to vote in favor of the repurchase plan.14 In addition, the maximum length that
a repurchase plan can be in eﬀect before it requires a new vote is 18 months, and a shorter
time if speciﬁed. After the Securities Act went into the eﬀect, Norwegian ﬁrms were
allowed to announce a repurchase plan, but not execute any repurchases before January
1999. When a ﬁrm has repurchased shares, the shares are ﬁrst assigned as treasury
stock with no voting or cash ﬂow rights as long as the company owns them. Firms
may then reduce the number of treasury stock by retiring these shares or as a payment
in various transactions. What ﬁrms do with the shares after the repurchase varies, but
commonly ﬁrms use them as payment in acquisitions, sell them in the market or distribute
them to employees or managers as a part of a bonus plan etc. The dataset also contain
data on the sale of treasury stock. However, the paper only consider the part of the
sample related to the repurchases. Table 14 in appendix B show some aggregate statistics
for the sale/reduction of treasury stock. There are about six times as many repurchase
transactions as sales. However, the number of shares in the repurchases are only twice that
of the sales, and the average repurchase is about 1/3 of the size of a reduction in treasury
stock. This is probably because ﬁrms accumulate treasury stock through many smaller
transactions, and use the repurchased shares as payment in relatively large transactions
or retire relatively large amounts of shares in a single event.
The sample examined in this paper only includes announcements of open market share
repurchase programs and actual repurchases related to these announcements. Other types
of repurchases are rarely observed during the sample period.15 Recall that open market
share repurchase programs also are the most frequently observed repurchase method in
the U.S. and Canada as well. Furthermore, Norwegian listed ﬁrms do not have to receive
approval from the stock exchange before initiating a repurchase program. In the U.S. the
same rule applies as in Norway. However, Canadian ﬁrms (see Ikenberry et al. (2000)),
must receive approval from the exchange before they can initiate a repurchase program.
When a ﬁrm actually execute an open market repurchase the law requires the ﬁrm to
report this to the OSE on the same day or before the trading starts the following day.
This is very diﬀerent from the US, where ﬁrms are not required to report their actual
14It also requires 2/3 vote of all shares represented at the meeting (including non-voting shares).
15One example is Storebrand (STB) which at the beginning January 1999 gave an oﬀer to shareholders
that owned less than 8 shares to sell their shares back to the company. Of the total 74000 shareholders at
the time, 39000 owned less than 8 shares.
12repurchase activity. Moreover, several studies note that ﬁrms actual repurchase activity
in the US is very hard to measure (see e.g. Jagannathan et al. (2000)). Canadian ﬁrms
are required to report their aggregate repurchase activity every quarter.
3.2 The Norwegian tax system
Dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public- or private limited company
were taxed fully on the investor’s hand until 1992. As a result of an extensive tax-
reform in 1992, dividends became tax-exempt while the capital gains tax was set at a
ﬂat rate of 28%, both for individuals, companies and private pension funds.16 However,
shareholders in ﬁrms that retain a part of their after tax earnings, may experience that
some of the capital gains when the shares are sold reﬂect a price increase due to the
retained earnings. To eliminate the double taxation this would imply, an adjustment is
made. The retained earnings per share is added to the cost basis (usually the purchase
price) such that the capital gain/tax basis is reduced accordingly (RISK adjustment).17
Thus, during the period 1992 until 2001, dividends were not taxed on the investor’s hand
at all, and tax on capital gains linked to retained earnings was eliminated. However, in
2001, personal tax on dividends was re-introduced, at a rate of 11%, while the capital
gains tax and corporate tax remained at 28%. With respect to the dividend taxation, a
basic deduction of NOK 10 000 was introduced. Thus, small investors in dividend paying
ﬁrms were not directly aﬀected by the tax increase. However, for larger investors the total
taxation on dividends increased from 28% to 35.92%, due to the double taxation of parts
of the earnings. In 2002 the personal taxation of dividends was removed. With respect
to foreign shareholders, dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public or
private limited company to its non-resident shareholders are subject to 25% withholding
tax. Tax treaties may make the withholding tax deductible in the shareholder’s home
country. Non-resident shareholders gain on a sale of shares in a Norwegian company
is not subject to any Norwegian taxation, unless the shares form part of a permanent
establishment in Norway or the seller is an individual who fulﬁll certain conditions that
would make the gain taxable at a rate of 28%.
With respect to the relative tax treatment of dividends and repurchases in Norway,
we see that there has been a change during our sample period from 1999 through 2001.
However, in 1999 and 2001, dividend distributions were not taxed. On the other hand
repurchases where the shareholder sell shares above the tax basis was taxed at 28%. Thus,
in cases where the ﬁrm uses already taxed earnings for repurchasing shares at a price
above the tax basis, the shareholder that sell shares back to the ﬁrm would experience
a double taxation on the excess capital gains. In 2000, when a dividend tax of 11% was
introduced, the tax diﬀerential between capital gains and dividends was reduced, favoring
repurchases. With respect to foreign investors, they have been subject to 25% withholding
tax on dividends through the entire sample period. However, since the capital gains for
foreigners is subject to the tax in the home country, the preference between dividends and
repurchases may vary between foreign investors depending on the tax treatment in their
home country.
16labor unions, non-proﬁt organizations and public pension funds are exempt from taxation.
17RISK is the acronym for ”Regulering av Inngangsverdien med Skattlagt Kapital”. Translated, it means
that there is an adjustment of the cost basis by the retained earnings after corporate tax. To be eligible
to the RISK adjustment within a given year, the shareholder must have owned the shares over the turn of
the year.
134 Data description
4.1 Announcements of repurchase programs
In panel A of table 1, we report some general statistics for the announcement data. Over
the entire period period from 1998 through 2001 there were 318 announcements of repur-
chase plans by 163 diﬀerent ﬁrms. Of these ﬁrms, 70 announced one repurchase plan, 46
announced two plans, 32 announced 3 plans and 15 announced 4 repurchase plans during
the sample period. Over the diﬀerent sample years, the number of announcing ﬁrms in-
creased from 30 to 109, while the maximum number of announcements by a single ﬁrm in
one year was two. For the individual years, we also show statistics on the announcement
frequencies in the middle section of panel A. In column n=1, the numbers represent the
number of ﬁrms that announced for the ﬁrst time in the respective year, column n=2
report the number of ﬁrms that announce for the second time in the respective year and
so on. Thus, in 2001 32 ﬁrms announced for the ﬁrst time, 30 for the second time, 35 for
the third time and 12 for the fourth time. When looking at the distribution of authorized
repurchase amounts across ﬁrms, we see that they are highly skewed with a maximum
(and median) amount of 10% and a mean amount of 9.5% while the lowest repurchase
amount announced by a ﬁrm was 1% of outstanding shares. Thus, the majority of the
announcements was for the maximum legal limit of 10%.18
Panel B in table 1 report the completion rates across ﬁrms that announced a repurchase
plan. For the whole sample about 60% (100 ﬁrms) of the announcing ﬁrms repurchased
at least some shares following at least one of their announcements, while 63 of the ﬁrms
that announced a repurchase program never repurchased any shares within the repurchase
period.19 With respect to the ﬁrms that actually executed repurchases, the mean fraction
of outstanding shares that was repurchased was 2.9%, while the median ﬁrm repurchased
1.8%. The maximum accumulated fraction repurchased by any ﬁrm during a repurchase
period was 22.1%. This is above the legal limit of 10%. And for some ﬁrms there is
an apparent breach of the legal limit, but this is probably because these ﬁrms during
the repurchase period used some of the repurchased shares as payment in transactions,
wrote down some of the repurchased shares or distributed them to employees, managers
as part of a bonus program or other events that is not captured in our data.20 The
median number of days between the announcement of a repurchase plan and the ﬁrst
repurchase was 169 days, while the mean number of days was 198. Thus, on average it
seems like the repurchase plan is put in place not for immediate executions. However, the
minimum number of days indicate that some ﬁrms also repurchase shares immediately
after the announcement has been made. For announcements in 1998 these numbers are
biased upwards because ﬁrms were not allowed to execute repurchases before 1999, but
could announce a repurchase plan in 1998. Across months (not reported), there is some
degree of clustering in May and June. The reason for this is that many repurchase plans
are voted on at the annual shareholders meetings, which for many ﬁrms are conducted
during spring.
18Since some ﬁrms do not explicitly report a maximum amount to be repurchased, we assume that these
ﬁrms are subject to the maximum legal limit of 10%.
19The repurchase period is deﬁned as the period in which the shareholders give the manager authorization
to repurchase shares.
20The Securities Act (Aksjeloven) only require the holding of treasury shares to be no more than 10%
of the ﬁrms outstanding shares.
14Table 1: Descriptive statistics of announcements
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the announcements of repurchase plans for the entire sample period
from 1998 through 2001 as well as for separate years. The ﬁrst column report the number of announcements,
the second column report the number of diﬀerent ﬁrms that announced at least one repurchase plan, and
the third column report the maximum announcements by one ﬁrm within the speciﬁed period. The next
four columns decompose the frequency of repurchase announcements. For the whole sample, n=1 counts
the number of ﬁrms that announce once, and n=4 counts the number of ﬁrms that announce 4 times. For
the separate years, n=1 counts the number of ﬁrms that announce for the ﬁrst time in the respective year,
while n=2 counts the number of ﬁrms announcing for the second time etc. For example, in 2001 there were
32 ﬁrms that announced for the ﬁrst time, 30 ﬁrms that had announced once in one of the previous three
years, 35 ﬁrms that had announced a repurchase plan in two of the previous three years and 12 ﬁrms that
had announced four times during the previous four years. The last three columns of the table report the
cross-sectional minimum, mean and maximum amount of shares that the ﬁrm was authorized to repurchase
by the current owners. Panel B shows statistics with respect to the completion rates where ”Repo” denotes
the number of ﬁrms that actually repurchase after an announcement, and ”Norepo” denote the number of
ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan but do not execute any repurchases. The median, mean and max
completion rates are calculated relative to the number of shares repurchased divided by the total number
of outstanding shares. The last four columns report distribution of days between announcement of a plan
and the ﬁrst repurchase.
Panel A: Announcement statistics
Number of ﬁrms (i) Authorized
announcing n times repurchase amount
Announce- Diﬀerent Max
Period ments ﬁrms (i) ann. n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 Min. Mean Max.
Whole sample 318 163 4 70 46 32 15 1.0% 9.5% 10.0%
1998 28 28 1 28 - - - 2.5% 9.1% 10.0%
1999 85 85 1 70 15 - - 1.0% 9.5% 10.0%
2000 93 90 2 33 47 10 - 1.0% 9.4% 10.0%
2001 112 109 2 32 30 35 12 3.3% 9.6% 10.0%
Panel B: Completion rates for announcing ﬁrms
Repurchasing ﬁrms Completion rates Days until ﬁrst repurchase
Period Repo Norepo Median Mean Max Min Median Mean Max
Whole sample 100 63 1.8% 2.9% 22.1% 1 169 198 502
1998 15 13 1.9% 2.9% 10.0% 20 364 326 469
1999 41 44 1.9% 3.2% 19.0% 9 203 216 502
2000 65 25 1.8% 2.9% 16.1% 2 217 206 498
2001 60 49 1.3% 2.7% 22.1% 1 123 138 459
154.2 Actual repurchases
The sample of actual repurchases reported to the OSE from January 1999 through De-
cember 2002 was obtained from the Oslo Stock Exchange. In addition, the dataset was
updated and cross checked using detailed records from the equity feed database of Oslo
Exchange Information (OBI).21
Panel A in table 2 show various statistics for the actual repurchase activity across
ﬁrms for the whole sample as well as for separate years. The ﬁrms that repurchased
shares executed a total of 1719 repurchases including all repurchases executed in 2002
(denoted as 2002a in the table). When excluding repurchases in 2002 that were not
related to repurchase plans initiated in 2001 or earlier22 (denoted as 2002b in the table),
the total number of repurchases related to announcements in 1998-2001 was 1375. In the
rest of the paper we will examine the repurchases related to these announcements and
ignore the 344 repurchases that was executed due to repurchase plans announced in 2002
since we do not have this information yet. The median ﬁrm executed 7 repurchases for
the entire sample period, while the maximum number of repurchases executed by a single
ﬁrm was 197. The average size of the repurchases was 166 thousand shares or about NOK
7.8 mill. Overall, the repurchases related to plans announced in 1998-2001 resulted in
Norwegian ﬁrms repurchasing 210 million shares worth more than NOK 15 bill. During
the same period, the total market value of all ﬁrms on the OSE was about NOK 600 bill.
on average. The total dividends paid out by all ﬁrms at the OSE (including ﬁrms that did
not announce) during the same period amounted to about NOK 60 bill.23 Since Norwegian
ﬁrms were ﬁrst allowed to repurchase shares in 1999, they have increased their spending
on repurchases as a percentage of cash dividends to 25% in 1999 and to 44% in 2000
and 2001. However, for 2002 there was a drop in the repurchase activity, while dividend
payments was high compared to the other years. Examining the other statistics across
diﬀerent years, the ﬁrst thing to note is the increase in repurchasing ﬁrms and repurchases
(N) from 1999 through 2001, and then a signiﬁcant drop in repurchase activity in 2002.
This trend is also evident when looking at the total number of shares and the NOK volume
of all repurchases. One main reason for this drop in repurchases in 2002 may be related to
the fact that the personal tax on dividends, which was introduced in 2001, was removed
in 2002 which made it relatively more attractive for private investors to get cash paid
out as dividends.24 Another interesting observation is that, while the repurchase volume
increased from 1999 through 2001, the average NOK size of each repurchase decreased
while the average number of shares in each repurchase increased. Panel B in table 2
report monthly summary statistics of our repurchase sample. The table shows the number
of diﬀerent ﬁrms that executed repurchases, the number of repurchases conducted by these
ﬁrms, as well as the aggregate share volume and NOK volume of these repurchases for each
sample month. As can seen from the table there is an increasing trend until September
2001. In fact, for the entire sample, September 2001, was the month in the sample that
most ﬁrms executed repurchases and the share volume of repurchases was the highest. This
is probably related to the large drop in share-prices due to the terrorist attacks in the US
21More speciﬁcally, Record E 19, Trading in Company Shares, in the Equity Feed data from Oslo
Exchange Information (OBI) was used to track companies repurchase activity.
22These repurchases are repurchases up until 18 months after the most recent announcement in
2000/2001, or until a new announcement in 2002.
23Note that these dividend numbers are aggregates for all companies listed on the OSE, not only for the
ﬁrms executing repurchases. The dividend statistics are oﬃcial numbers from the Oslo Stock Exchange.
24This reasoning require that ﬁrms take into account the tax schedule of their investors.
16on September 11th. In fact, when looking more closely on the amount of repurchases
that were executed within that speciﬁc month, there was a huge increase in repurchases
just after the terror events. More than 75% of the repurchases and 65% of the share-
volume that month occurred in the week after the attacks. This is similar to what was
observed in the US when a large amount of US ﬁrms increased their repurchase activity to
supply liquidity and support their share prices. In fact, on September 13th, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended regulations on repurchases allowing ﬁrms to
repurchase shares without any volume limits. About 75 corporations responded during
the ﬁrst day of trading after the attacks by announcing the initiation or renewal of a
repurchase plan, and the dollar value of their buybacks on the opening day was estimated
at more than USD 45 billion.25
5 Estimation methodology
5.1 Measuring abnormal announcement returns
In the paper we investigate the short term price impact related both to the announce-
ment of repurchase plans as well as when the market learns that the ﬁrm actually has
repurchased shares. For these purposes, we apply a standard event study methodology.
To investigate the short term eﬀect around an event, we examine various event windows
surrounding the event. We use daily returns which are indexed relative to an event, and
deﬁne τ as the event time, with the event date at τ=0. The event date is the date at
which the event (the repurchase plan or actual repurchase) is announced to the market.
For the various event windows we denote the beginning of the event window as τ1 and
the end of the event window as τ2. We apply three model speciﬁcations to characterize
normal returns; the market model, the Fama and French (1993) three factor model and
the Carhart (1997) four factor model. All benchmarks models are calibrated during the
estimation period running from two years prior (τ=-571) to the event until the start of
the event period at τ1 for each ﬁrm, i.26 Since many of the companies at the OSE, and
hence in our sample, are not traded every day, our OLS beta estimates may be biased due
to the intervaling eﬀect. To reduce the potential bias, we also estimate adjusted betas for
the market model as suggested by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979). In
the regular market model, normal returns are expressed as,
d E[Riτ] = αi + βiRm
τ (1)
where Riτ is the return on security i on event date τ, Rm
τ is the value weighted total return
on the OSE all share index, and E[εi,τ] = 0 and Var[εi,τ] = σ2
εi. In the Dimson (1979)
speciﬁcation, we run an multivariate version of eq.(1) of securities returns against lagged
(Rm
τ−1), contemporaneous (Rm
τ ) and leading (Rm
τ+1) market returns. As proposed in Dimson
(1979), we obtain a consistent estimate of beta by summing the slope coeﬃcients from this
regression. The Scholes and Williams (1977) procedure is similar, but instead of estimating
the β’s simultaneously, the three betas are estimated separately and the aggregated beta
25Also during the market crash in 1987 there was a surge in repurchase activity after the market collapse.
During the fourth quarter of 1987 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that 995 ﬁrms announced a
repurchase plan.
26Some ﬁrms have a shorter price history. However, since none of these ﬁrms have less than half a year






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18estimate is adjusted for the autocorrelation in the market return to obtain a consistent
estimate of β. Thus, by denoting the lagged-, matching- and leading beta estimates as
β+
i , βi and β−
i respectively, the consistent beta estimate, relative to the Scholes/Williams




i + ^ βi + ^ β−
i
1 + 2^ ρM
(2)
where ^ ρM is the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the market index, and ^ βSW
i denotes the
Scholes/Williams estimate. In addition to applying the market model, we use the Fama
and French (1993) three factor model as well as the four factor model suggested by Carhart
(1997) adding momentum to the Fama/French factors.27 With respect to the four factor
model, expected returns are described as,













τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-,
the size- and the momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures.
The book-to-market and size factor returns are calculated as the diﬀerence between two
value weighted portfolios containing ﬁrms with a book to market value (or size) above
the median and below the median. All ﬁrms at the OSE are assigned to one of the two
portfolios at the beginning of each year. With respect to the momentum portfolios, ﬁrms
are assigned to one of two portfolios based on the return over the previous year.28 The
exposures are estimated over the same post-event period as the market model in eq.1.
Having estimated the parameters in the various model speciﬁcations described above,
we measure the daily abnormal returns as the daily prediction errors relative to the ex-
pected return, d E[Riτ] as,
c ARiτ = Riτ − d E[Riτ] (4)
where d E[Riτ] is the expected return of security i, deﬁned by either the market model, the
Fama and French (1993) model or the Carhart (1997) model, on date τ given the return
on the market and the contemporaneous factor returns. For each ﬁrm in the sample, we
calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) across the event window from τ1 to τ2. By
cumulating the c ARiτ from τ1 up to, and including, τ2 for the diﬀerent time windows, for









where N is the total number of ﬁrms/events.
The main null hypothesis to be tested is that the cumulative abnormal return during
the main event-window across ﬁrms is equal to zero. We use the standard test statistic
proposed in Brown and Warner (1985) who argue that standard procedures are typically
27However, Brown and Weinstein (1985) and Campbell et al. (1997) argue that the use of more sophisti-
cated models has little practical advantages relative to an unrestricted market model when we examine the
short term market impact. The main reason is that the marginal explanatory power of additional factors
to the market factor is usually relatively small, and therefore there is little reduction in the variance of
abnormal returns.
28A number of ﬁlters are applied before a stock can enter the portfolios. Minimum number of trading
days of 20, minimum price of 10 and minimum ﬁrm value of 1 mill NOK.
19well-speciﬁed even when special daily data characteristics are ignored. The test statistic we
apply is the ratio of the average cumulative abnormal return, across ﬁrms, to its estimated







ε(τ1,τ2) is the average estimated variance for the abnormal returns across ﬁrms.
Two estimators of the variance is commonly used in event studies. The most frequently
applied estimator uses the standard deviation of abnormal returns from the expected
return model estimated in the estimation period prior to the event. The second estimator
uses the standard deviation of the cross-sectional CARs from the event window. The latter
estimator is generally used when the event is expected to change the risk of the ﬁrm, and
the pre-event estimator for the variance may be biased. In our case, we use the ﬁrst
estimator for variance when examining the announcement eﬀect, since the announcement
itself is not expected to aﬀect the risk of the ﬁrm. When we later in the paper (section
6.4) examine the abnormal returns around the actual repurchases, on the other hand, we
provide results using the second approach, since the transactions potentially change the
riskiness of the ﬁrm.29
5.2 Measuring long run performance
Portfolio creation
We also examine the long run performance of portfolios of announcing ﬁrms and for
portfolios conditional on whether the ﬁrm actually execute repurchases or not. To facilitate
this we apply a calendar time approach used in e.g. Ikenberry et al. (1995), Womack (1996)
and Ikenberry et al. (2000) among others. To explain how this applied in this paper, we
will use the case when we construct a portfolio of ﬁrms conditional on that they have
announced a repurchase plan.30
More speciﬁcally, we create a portfolio of ﬁrms given that they have announced a
repurchase plan and calculate the daily returns of this portfolio through calendar time,
t. We rebalance the portfolio the ﬁrst day of every month. Moreover, all ﬁrms that
have announced a repurchase plan in the previous month are added to the portfolio, and
all ﬁrms are rebalanced to equal weights. We write the return on the equally weighted





where wi,t denotes the weight of each ﬁrm in the portfolio which in our case is just
1/Ni,t where Ni,t is the number of securities in the portfolio at date t. To minimize the
idiosyncratic risk in our portfolio, we do not start our portfolio construction before 10
companies have announced a repurchase plan. We also examine several holding periods,
where ﬁrms are kept in the portfolio for one year, two years and three years as well as for
the remaining sample period (buy and hold). For e.g. the yearly holding period, a ﬁrm
29If the ARτ are independent identically distributed and normal, the test statistic is distributed Student-t
under the null hypothesis.
30However, later in the paper we will also use the same methodology when measuring the performance
of portfolios conditional on the actual repurchase activity of the announcing ﬁrms.
20is removed from the portfolio after one year. These portfolio strategies represents simple
and realistic trading strategies, where the inclusion of stocks depends on whether they
have announced a repurchase period in the previous month. It should be noted that we do
not take into account transaction costs, but since we rebalance the portfolio on a monthly
basis, these costs would not be very large.31
Benchmark models
The long term abnormal performance may to a large degree depend on the benchmark
model against which we compare our portfolio returns. In addition, several papers note
that long-term abnormal performance tests may be due to misspeciﬁcation rather than
mispricing. Thus, as argued by Kothari and Warner (1997) among others, caution should
be used when interpreting the results.32 We try to reduce this problem by measuring our
sample portfolio returns generated from the trading strategy relative to several models.
We evaluate the performance of our repurchase portfolio by estimating Jensen’s alpha
relative to a one factor CAPM model as well as the Fama and French (1993) model and
the Carhart (1997) model, E.g. for the Carhart model we run the following regression,
Rpt − Rf





t + εt (8)
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing ﬁrms created
through calendar time, Rf





τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum
factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated
similarly as in eq. 3 and α measures the average daily excess performance of the portfolio.
6 Results
Our empirical analysis consists of four parts. The ﬁrst part in section 6.1 evaluate the
short term market reaction around the announcement of repurchase plans. The second
part, in section 6.2, tests the underreaction hypothesis in Norway by examining the long
term performance of a portfolio of ﬁrms that have announced a repurchase plan. The
third part, in section 6.3, combines the announcement data with the actual repurchase
data and examine whether the long-run performance depend on whether ﬁrms repurchase
or not. The fourth part, in section 6.4, examines the short term market impact of the
actual repurchases.
31The transaction costs would in reality depend on the size of the portfolio. For a small portfolio, the
total commissions related to the rebalancing could constitute a large fraction of invested wealth. For a
large portfolio, on the other hand, the commissions would be a smaller part of invested amount, while the
implicit costs related to price impact and delay when the portfolio is rebalanced is likely to constitute a
larger fraction of total costs.
32Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that bootstrapping procedures may help mitigating the potential
biases in long-term performance measurement. With respect to bootstrapping, it is important to have
a large number of ﬁrms to match against. One problem in Norway is that there are very few similar
companies, in addition to that we want to match against non-announcing ﬁrms, which makes this approach
diﬃcult to implement in a satisfactory way in this study.
33As the risk free rate we use the 3 month Norwegian interbank oﬀered rate (NIBOR).
216.1 The short term eﬀect of announcing a repurchase plan
In table 3 we report the average cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announce-
ment of repurchase plans. For all announcements, the table shows the average excess return
relative to the market model (unadjusted and adjusted as proposed in Dimson (1979) and
Scholes and Williams (1977)), the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. In the table we also show the average announcement
eﬀect for separate years and when split the sample into announcements that specify that
the ﬁrm will repurchase more or less than 5% of their outstanding shares. In these cases
we report results only from a Carhart (1997) speciﬁcation for normal returns. In the table
we use an event window staring two days before the announcement and ending two days
after the event. The main reasons for why we use a relative large event window is that the
announcements of the outcome of the vote on the repurchase plans are in some cases on
the same day as the shareholder meeting, while it in other cases is announced up to a few
days after the shareholder meeting. Thus, for those announcements that are delayed, the
outcome of the vote is likely to be known to the market before the announcement. In fact,
when looking at the cumulative abnormal return from 60 days prior to the announcement
of the repurchase plan through 60 days after the announcement in ﬁgure 1, there is some
indication that there is a positive impact starting before the announcement. Thus, the
relatively large window reduces the power of the tests, but since we want to capture the
entire market reaction we use a relatively large window. In addition, the table report the
average cumulative abnormal return from 60 days prior to the announcement and until 60
days after the announcement.
The ﬁrst thing to note from the table is that the announcement eﬀect is positive
and signiﬁcant for the whole sample, with an average signiﬁcant announcement eﬀect of
about 2.5%. This is very similar to what is found for other markets and time periods in
e.g. Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000). With respect to the
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, the results are quantitatively similar. We do not, however,
ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative CAR for the 60 day period prior to the announcement for all
announcements of for announcements within separate years. This is in contrast to other
studies that ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative abnormal return prior to the announcement. Thus,
in the Norwegian market, it does not seem that ﬁrms decision to announce a repurchase
plan is inﬂuenced by the (risk adjusted) prior performance of the ﬁrm at least relative to
the three months prior to the announcement. This may be explained by the ﬁndings in
panel B in table 1, where we found that the number of days between the announcement of
the plan and the ﬁrst repurchase execution was almost 200 days. Thus, the announcement
does not, on average, seem to be triggered by a negative drift prior to the announcement.
When examining the announcement eﬀect for diﬀerent years, we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect
for all years, but the announcement eﬀect is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
announcements in 1999 and 2001. In addition, only ﬁrms that announce that they are
planning on repurchasing more than 5% of their outstanding shares experience a signiﬁcant
abnormal price impact, while the excess return for ﬁrms that announce a lower repurchase
fraction is positive but insigniﬁcant. Table 13 in appendix A shows the results from a
robustness check where all ﬁrms with an announcement CAR below the 5th and above
the 95th percentile are removed from the sample. The announcement eﬀect falls to about
1.9%, but is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
To examine in more detail what factors are important with respect to the size of the
announcement eﬀect, we run the following regression with the cumulative abnormal return
22Table 3: Abnormal returns around announcements of repurchase plans
The table shows the abnormal return (in percent) around announcements of repurchase plans. The abnormal return
is measured relative to a one factor market model (unadjusted and adjusted for biases induced by infrequent trading
as proposed in Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977)), Fama and French (1993) three factor model and
the Carhart (1997) four factor model, with the value weighted OSE general index as the market portfolio. The
sub-sample regressions and the repurchase% regressions are cumulative excess returns relative to the Carhart four
factor model. Numbers in bold represent numbers signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, and numbers in
parenthesis are the associated t-values.
Days relative to announcement date τ1 to τ2
n -60 to -3 -2 to +2 +3 to +60
Whole sample (1998-2001)
Unadjusted market model 318 -0.23 (-0.29) 2.52 (3.72) 0.51 (0.62)
Dimson (1979) 318 -0.06 (-0.07) 2.43 (3.53) 0.24 (0.29)
Scholes and Williams (1977) 318 -0.25 (-0.32) 2.44 (3.58) 0.20 (0.24)
Fama and French (1993) 318 -0.31 (-0.41) 2.52 (3.72) 0.63 (0.77)
Carhart (1997) 318 -0.25 (-0.34) 2.62 (3.86) 0.62 (0.75)
Subsamples (year)
1998 28 1.59 (0.85) 1.25 (0.57) 1.47 (0.89)
1999 85 -0.68 (-0.56) 2.79 (2.66) 2.35 (1.53)
2000 93 -1.97 (-1.63) 1.36 (1.30) 0.42 (0.25)
2001 112 1.03 (0.66) 3.86 (2.72) -0.80 (-0.56)
Announced repurchase limit (%)
<0%- 5%] 42 -2.93 (-1.85) 3.37 (1.30) -0.81 (-0.46)
<5%-10%] 276 0.16 (0.19) 2.50 (3.70) 0.84 (0.92)
Figure 1: Cumulative average abnormal return
The ﬁgure shows the CAR relative to a Carhart (1997) model across all 318 announcements that occurred in the
period 1999 through 2001. The CAR is the accumulated average abnormal returns starting 60 days prior to the
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23across the event window for each announcement, d CARi(τ1,τ2), as the dependent variable,
d CARi(τ1,τ2) = α + β1 d CARi,τ1−k + β2SPRi,τ1−k + β3MCAPi,τ1−1
+ β4BMi,τ1−1 + β5PERCi,τ + DIVi,τ1−360 + QuickRatioi,τ + i
(9)
where α is the intercept term, CARi,τ1−k is the cumulative abnormal return over the k
days prior to the event window, SPRi,τ1−k is the average relative spread34 across the k days
prior to the event window, MCAPi,τ1−1 is the natural log of the ﬁrms market capitalization
on the last date before the event window, BMi,τ1−1 is the book to market value on the
last date before the event window, PERCi,τ is the size of the repurchase plan, DIVτ1−360
is a dummy variable indicating whether a ﬁrm has paid any cash dividends during the
previous year and QuickRatioi,τ is the most recently reported quick ratio35 before the
ﬁrm announces a repurchase plan.
Panel A in table 4 shows the results from the cross sectional regression when τ1=-2,
τ2=2 and k=20, and panel B shows the correlations between the variables. As can be seen
from panel B, the average pre-event spread (SPRi,τ1−k) is strongly negatively correlated
with market capitalization (MCAPi,τ1−1). This is because large ﬁrms generally are more
liquid and has lower spreads. In addition, as noted by Vermaelen (1981), small ﬁrms may
have a greater degree of asymmetric information since they are less closely followed by
analysts and the popular press. Thus, both the spread and market capitalization vari-
ables capture to a large degree these same characteristics. The second highest correlation
is between the book to market (BMi,τ1) variable and the pre-event (20 days) cumulative
abnormal return, which has a signiﬁcant positive correlation of 0.26. To reduce the multi-
colinearity problem when including all these variables in the regression, we orthogonalize
both the market capitalization against the relative spread measure as well as the book to
market variable against the pre announcement CAR (CARi,τ1−k).36 Panel C in the table
shows some descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Note that the MCAPi,τ1−1
is in natural logs and that the d CARi,τ1−k is not in percentage terms.
We estimate two models. Model 1 include all variables, and in model 2 the variables
related to ﬁrm liquidity are omitted. The ﬁrst thing to note is that the greater (lower) the
cumulative excess performance ( d CARi,τ1−k) during the 20 days prior to the announcement,
the lower (greater) is the price impact at the announcement date. Although we did not
ﬁnd support for a negative drift in cumulative abnormal returns before the announcement
on average in table 3, this indicates that some ﬁrms may announce a repurchase plan as
a response to a price decline. From an undervaluation viewpoint, this suggests that the
market perceives it as more likely that the ﬁrm is undervalued the worse the pre-event
performance has been, and put more weight on the signal the worse the prior performance
of the stock. This ﬁnding is similar to what is found in Comment and Jarrell (1991) and
Chan et al. (2003) who argue that the credibility of the signal (proxied by the announce-
ment eﬀect) increases with the underperformance of the ﬁrm relative to the general market
in the period prior to the announcement of the repurchase program. Furthermore, ﬁrms
with larger spreads (SPRi,τ1−k) experience a greater price impact at the announcement
34The relative spread for a security for a day, τ, is calculated as SPRτ = (askτ−bidτ)/[(askτ+bidτ)/2],
where askτ and bidτ is the best ask and bid quotes at the close of day τ.
35The quick ratio is calculated as the sum of cash and deposits, total short-term ﬁnancial investments
and total short-term receivables divided by total short-term debt
36When estimating the regressions with the original (nonorthogonalized) variables the results are quan-
titatively similar.
24date than ﬁrms with smaller spreads. If the spread proxy for market liquidity, this result
is expected in the sense that the market price moves more for a less liquid stock. If the
announcement results in an excess demand for the stock, at the announcement, the supply
side of the order book will be exhausted more easily for a less liquid stock than a more
liquid stock. In addition, since the spread may also proxy for asymmetric information,
the announcement of a repurchase plan may have a stronger signalling value for a security
where there is a higher uncertainty about ﬁrm value and potentially more private infor-
mation is revealed through the announcement. With respect to the market capitalization
variable (MCAP) we ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms experience a lower abnormal price impact than
smaller ﬁrms. As mentioned earlier, the reason for this may be that smaller ﬁrms are
generally less liquid and that an announcement is more valuable to the market for small
ﬁrms if there is larger information asymmetries in smaller ﬁrms.
Further, we also ﬁnd that value stocks, with a high book-to-market value, experience
a stronger price impact than growth stocks. One interpretation for this is that value ﬁrms
are more likely to be undervalued relative to growth ﬁrms, and that the announcement of
a repurchase plan may conﬁrm the markets perception of undervaluation. With respect
to the size of the repurchase plan, it does not explain any variation in the announcement
eﬀect. Initially, one would expect that a larger repurchase plan would be a stronger signal
about undervaluation. However, as discussed earlier, a large fraction of the announcements
are for the maximum allowed size of 10%. Thus, there may be too little variation in
this variable to account for any variation in the CAR. Wether the ﬁrm has paid any
dividend the previous year is not related to the announcement eﬀect. With respect to
the dividend variable, one could initially expect this to be negative if ﬁrms that has
paid dividends the previous year is expected to continue paying dividends in the future
(dividend smoothing). If ﬁrms are expected to continue using excess cash to pay dividends,
this lowers the probability that they will repurchase, and the potential positive eﬀects
related to repurchases discussed in section 2 are less likely to occur. Finally, the most
recent quick ratio before the announcement, is negatively related to the announcement
eﬀect. Initially, one would expect this variable to be positive in the sense that liquid ﬁrms
may be expected to actually execute repurchases such that the signal is more credible
when ﬁrms are liquid. On the other hand, the announcement may to a greater extent be
expected by the market in these cases.
6.2 Long-term performance of ﬁrms announcing a repurchase plan
In this section we examine the long term performance of ﬁrms announcing a repurchase
plan. The main hypothesis to be investigated is the underreaction hypothesis of Ikenberry
et al. (1995) who argue that, if a repurchase announcement is a positive signal, this signal
should be, in an eﬃcient market, incorporated into prices completely and in an unbiased
fashion when the ﬁrm announces the repurchase plan. In the previous section we found a
signiﬁcant positive announcement eﬀect of about 2.5%. In panel A of table 5 we report the
results from evaluating the long term abnormal performance of a calendar time portfolio
of announcing ﬁrms. The portfolio is rebalanced every month. All stocks that announce
a repurchase plan during a month are added to the portfolio the ﬁrst day of the following
month. At the beginning of each month, all ﬁrms receive equal weights in the portfolio.
We also examine in panel B of table 5 the performance of our portfolio with respect to
various ﬁxed holding periods from 1 to 4 years in addition to a buy-and-hold strategy
(“whole sample”) where the stock remains in the portfolio for the rest of the period.
25Table 4: Cross-sectional CAR regression
Panel A in shows the results from the cross sectional regression of CARi(τ1,τ2) on various variables. Model 1 is
estimated as,
d CARi(τ1,τ2) = α + β1 d CARi,τ1−k + β2SPRi,τ1−k + β3MCAPi,τ1−1
+ β4BMi,τ1−1 + β5PERCi,τ + β6DIVi,τ1−360 + β7QuickRatioi,τ + i
(10)
where i denotes the announcements, α is the intercept, d CARi,τ1−k is the cumulative abnormal return over the
k days prior to the event window, SPRi,τ1−k is the average spread across the k days prior to the event window,
MCAPi,τ1−1 is the natural log market capitalization on the last date before the event window, BMi,τ1−1 is the book
to market value on the last date before the event window, PERCi,τ is the size of the repurchase plan and DIVτ1−360
is a dummy indicating whether a ﬁrm has paid any dividends during the last year and QuickRatioi,τ is the most
recent quick ratio before the announcement. In the regression τ1=-2, τ2=2 and k=20. Note that the market
capitalization is orthogonalized against the spread measure, and the book-to-market variable is orthogonalized
against the d CARi,τ1−k variable. Panel B shows the Pearson’s correlations coeﬃcients between the variables used
in the regressions in panel A. The correlations for MCAP and SPR are before they are orthogonalized. Numbers in
bold refer to correlations signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. Panel C shows some descriptive statistics
for the variables.
Panel A: Cross sectional CAR regression
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Est. std.err. p-val. Part.R2 Est. std.err. p-val. Part.R2
Constant 0.041 0.034 0.228 - 0.026 0.036 0.463 -
d CARτ1−k -0.165 0.046 <0.001 0.027 -0.151 0.049 0.002 0.027
SPRτ1−k 0.338 0.067 <0.001 0.060 - - - -
MCAPτ1−1 -0.013 0.005 0.008 0.016 - - - -
BMτ1−1 0.023 0.006 <0.001 0.051 0.028 0.006 <0.001 0.051
PERCi -0.179 0.350 0.609 0.000 0.054 0.364 0.882 0.000
DIVi,τ1−360 -0.031 0.017 0.067 0.008 -0.035 0.018 0.045 0.012
Quick ratioτ -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.026 - - - -
adj.R2 0.171 0.078
N 318 318
Panel B: Variable correlations
d CARτ1−k SPRτ1−k MCAPτ1−1 BMτ1−1 PERCi,τ DIVτ1−240
SPRτ1−k 0.06
MCAPτ1−1 -0.05 -0.52
BMτ1−1 0.26 0.13 -0.07
PERC − i,τ 0.07 0.12 -0.15 -0.08
DIVτ1−360 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.12 -0.07
Quick ratioi,τ 0.01 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 0.08 -0.02
Panel C: Variable statistics
Variable Mean std.dev min max
d CARτ1−k -0.003 0.132 -0.43 0.33
MCAPτ1−1 (log) 20.602 1.512 16.13 25.12
BMτ1−1 1.328 1.111 0.24 8.54
PERCi 0.095 0.018 0.01 0.10
SPRτ1−k 0.064 0.093 0.01 0.81
DIVi,τ1−360 0.164 0.370 0 1
Quick ratioτ 2.078 2.668 0.26 31.79
26When a stock has been in the portfolio for the duration of the respective holding period,
it is removed from the portfolio until it announces a new repurchase plan. To reduce
the idiosyncratic risk of the portfolio, we require there to be at least 10 ﬁrms that has
announced a repurchase plan before we start the portfolio.37
Panel A in table 5 shows that for a buy-and-hold portfolio, with no limit on the
holding period, the portfolio signiﬁcantly outperforms the market by about 0.9% per
month, or 11% per year, when we adjust for the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) risk factors. This is in line with results in Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) who ﬁnds
an abnormal performance of 12.1% in the US and 7% per year in Canada respectively.
Relative to the CAPM, the excess performance is almost 2% per month, or almost 27%
per year, illustrating the importance of adjusting the portfolio performance for additional
risk factors in addition to the market risk. When restricting the holding period in panel
B, we ﬁnd, for the Fama/French and Carhart models, that there is a signiﬁcant excess
performance when the holding period is longer than 1 year. With respect to a CAPM
speciﬁcation, the portfolio outperforms regardless of the chosen holding period.
One important point with respect to evaluating the long term abnormal performance
in this type of study is that the expected return model may be misspeciﬁed. As shown
by Kothari and Warner (1997), in a random sample of 200 ﬁrms, about 35% of the ﬁrms,
independent of the benchmark model used, show an abnormal positive and negative ab-
normal performance over a 36 month period. Although they do not examine these issues
in the context of calendar time portfolios (only with respect to the long run performance
through event time), they argue that a calendar time approach may involve similar issues.
In this study we do not attempt to adjust for such biases, but instead examine several
model speciﬁcations for expected returns. An alternative approach could be to create a
matching portfolio of non announcing ﬁrms. However, since there are relatively few listed
companies at the OSE,38 implementing a matching procedure in a satisfactory way may
be diﬃcult. As noted by Kothari and Warner (1997), it is not necessarily enough to match
on size and book to market, but also other ﬁrm characteristics as well.
To examine the robustness of the results in table 5 we also estimate the excess returns
when we start the portfolio construction in diﬀerent years throughout the sample period
(1999, 2000 and 2001) and vary the holding period from 1 to 4 years. The results from
this analysis, relative to a Carhart (1997) speciﬁcation is reported in table 5. We also note
that the results when we start the portfolio construction in 1999 are very similar to the
results in table 5. The reason for this that we do not start the portfolio construction in
1998 before at least 10 ﬁrms have announced a repurchase plan, which is in October 1998.
Thus, the portfolio construction only starts 3 months later for the portfolio starting in
1999. In addition, since the time series becomes longer the earlier we start our portfolio,
the data used in later years are subsets of the data we use when starting the portfolio in
earlier years. However, the main point of the analysis is to check to what degree the results
change when we change the starting point of the sample. The results are similar to those
in panel B in table 5. There is no signiﬁcant excess performance for the announcement
portfolio for holding periods of one year. However, for holding periods of two years or
longer, there is a signiﬁcant abnormal performance regardless of the year when we start
the portfolio construction.
To summarize the analysis so far, both the results in table 5 and 6 support the under-
37When we use the entire sample period, this result in our portfolio starting in October 1998, when 10
ﬁrms had announced a repurchase plan.
38In the end of 1999, 2000 and 2001 there were respectively 215, 214 and 212 listed ﬁrms at the OSE.
27Table 5: Long term performance of the announcement portfolio
The table shows the excess performance of a calendar time portfolio of ﬁrms announcing a repurchase plan. The
excess return on the portfolio is both measured relative to a one-factor CAPM model (i), a three factor Fama and
French (1993) model (ii) and a four factor Carhart (1997) model (iii),
(i) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εt
(ii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + εt
(iii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing ﬁrms, Rf





τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum
factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly as in eq. 3
and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return on the factor
portfolios. The portfolio is rebalanced at the beginning of every month, and ﬁrms that announced a repurchase plan
during the previous month is included in the portfolio. Panel A shows the results for our buy-and-hold portfolio
when stocks are not sold (the stocks in the portfolio are hold through the entire sample from when they enter), and
Panel B shows the results when we vary the holding period from 1 months to the entire sample period. In both
panel A and panel B the average daily excess return, α, is reported in percent.
Panel A: Buy-hold portfolio performance (no limit on holding period)
Fama/
CAPM t-value French t-value Carhart t-value
α (%) 0.10 4.71 0.04 2.29 0.04 2.30
βm 0.58 33.79 0.72 38.88 0.72 37.94
βsmb - - 0.27 13.51 0.27 13.38
βhml - - 0.06 3.74 0.05 2.90
βmom - - - - -0.02 -0.98
adj.R2 0.523 0.602 0.602
N 1041 1041 1041
Panel B: Various holding periods
Holding CAPM Fama/French Carhart
period
α(%) t-value α(%) t-value α(%) t-value
1 year 0.064 2.18 0.008 0.28 0.008 0.27
2 years 0.087 4.49 0.036 1.98 0.036 1.99
3 years 0.100 4.61 0.046 2.28 0.047 2.29
4 years 0.099 4.73 0.045 2.31 0.045 2.32
Whole sample 0.098 4.71 0.044 2.29 0.045 2.30
28reaction hypothesis of Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000). The reaction to the announcement of
repurchase plans found in table 3 seem to be incomplete relative to the true value of the
signal conveyed through the announcement proxied by the long term excess performance
following the announcement. The subsequent abnormal performance for announcing ﬁrms
may be related to information surprises through e.g. public announcements or unexpected
earnings reports that occur after the announcement of the repurchase plan. However, we
cannot exclude the possibility that the excess performance may be due to miss-speciﬁcation
of the expected returns model as discussed in Kothari and Warner (1997) among others.
We try to reduce the misspeciﬁcation by using several model speciﬁcations for expected
returns. Including the size, book to market and momentum factors, reduces the excess
performance estimate relative to a CAPM speciﬁcation. However, for horizons longer than
one year, there is still evidence that the portfolio of announcing ﬁrms experience an excess
performance after having accounted for the portfolios exposure to these risk factors.
Table 6: Long term performance of announcement portfolio - varying starting year
The table shows the excess performance of a calendar time portfolio of ﬁrms announcing a repurchase plan for
various starting years and holding periods. The excess return on the portfolio is measured relative to a four factor
Carhart (1997) model,
Rpt − Rf






where Rpt is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing ﬁrms, Rf





τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum
factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly as in eq. 3
and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio after having adjusted for the Carhart risk
factors. The portfolio is rebalanced at the beginning of every month, and ﬁrms that announced a repurchase plan
during the previous month is included in the portfolio. The results when starting the portfolio construction in 1998
and 1999 are quite similar. This is mainly because we do not start the portfolio in 1998 before enough ﬁrms (10
ﬁrms) have announced a repurchase plan which is in October 1998.
Year when starting portfolio construction
1999 2000 2001
Holding
period α(%) t-value α(%) t-value α(%) t-value
1 year 0.009 0.31 0.008 0.23 0.02 0.46
2 years 0.038 2.11 0.044 2.09 0.07 2.59
3 years 0.049 2.40 0.059 2.38 - -
4 years 0.048 2.44 - - - -
6.3 Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity
In the previous section we found support for the underreaction hypothesis in the Norwegian
market. In this section we examine more closely the nature of the excess performance.
Moreover, we study whether the fact that a ﬁrm actually execute a repurchase or not is
important for the subsequent performance.
This is motivated by the fact that a repurchase announcement itself is not a commit-
ment to actually repurchase shares. Furthermore, the announcement does not impose any
costs on the managers in the announcing ﬁrms if the announcement is false.39 Thus, as
39As proposed by Fried (2002), if managers act opportunistically they may also announce a repurchase
29Table 7: Announcement CAR given subsequent repurchase activity
The table shows the abnormal returns (in percent) for diﬀerent periods around the announcement of repurchase
programs that resulted in actual repurchases versus announcements that did not result in subsequent repurchases.
The table also show the p-value from a test that the means between the two groups are equal.
Days relative to
announcement date (τ1 to τ2)
n -60 to -3 -2 to +2 +3 to +60
Announcement, no repurchase 133 -0.05% 2.39% 0.89%
Announcement, repurchase 185 -0.40% 2.78% 0.43%
Test for diﬀerence
in means (p-value) 0.54 0.75 0.62
discussed in Fried (2002) and Comment and Jarrell (1991), the credibility of the signal may
be questionable. On the other hand, when a ﬁrm actually executes a repurchase, this may
be perceived as a stronger signal about undervaluation since it involves real transactions.
Especially, if the manager or other insiders owns a stake in the company, since if they
repurchase when the ﬁrm is overvalued, the managers will increase their ownership in an
overvalued ﬁrm (assuming that they retain their shares). Thus, when the market observes
that the ﬁrm executes a repurchase it may be interpreted as a signal (or conﬁrmation of
the initial signal) that the the ﬁrm is actually undervalued.
Given that undervaluation is the main motivation for why ﬁrms repurchase shares,
the actual repurchase executions should be a positive signal to the market about ﬁrm
value. Moreover, one would expect the ﬁrm to execute repurchases until the ﬁrm is no
longer undervalued. If this is the case we expect the market to react positively to the
actual repurchases, and increase prices closer to the true value. Furthermore, if the ﬁrms
repurchase activity increases the price closer to the true value, reducing the mispricing,
this should also reduce the subsequent long run excess performance for these ﬁrms.40
Announcements that do not result in subsequent repurchases, may be because of sev-
eral reasons. First of all, the ﬁrm may simply not be mispriced after the announcement.
If these ﬁrms are more able to credibly signal that they are undervalued through the an-
nouncement of a repurchase plan, and the market fully reacts to the information conveyed
by the announcement, one would not expect these ﬁrms to repurchase any shares after the
announcement (at least not for undervaluation reasons). If this is the case, we would ex-
pect announcements that do not result in subsequent repurchases to experience a greater
announcement eﬀect than announcements that result in subsequent repurchases. To check
this, we examine, in table 7, whether announcements that do not result in subsequent re-
purchases experience a stronger announcement eﬀect than announcements that result in
repurchases. The results suggest that the announcement eﬀect (as well as the pre- and
post-announcement CAR) is similar for the two groups. Thus, there is no evidence that
announcements which result in subsequent repurchases experience a greater underreaction
than announcements that do not result in repurchases. Rather, the market reaction in the
two cases are remarkably similar.
plan when the ﬁrm is not undervalued to boost the stock price when selling.
40As discussed in section 2, ﬁrms also repurchase shares for many other reasons than undervaluation.
However, our main discussion will be centered around the undervaluation hypothesis.
30Another reason for why ﬁrms do not execute any repurchases may be because of
liquidity reasons. This can be due to low proﬁtability or that they do not have any
excess cash available for repurchasing shares. Thus, from an undervaluation perspective,
the managers may want to repurchase shares due to undervaluation, but are unable to
do so.41 An additional reason for why ﬁrms do not repurchase shares during the course
of a repurchase program is discussed in Ikenberry et al. (2000). Findings in Ikenberry
et al. (2000) indicates that managers are sensitive to price movements. Thus, if the price
increases, such that the stock potentially becomes overvalued, the manager may choose
not to execute repurchases.
Our main hypothesis is that if managers execute repurchases to exploit undervaluation,
and the market eﬃciently reacts to the signal conveyed through the actual repurchases, the
repurchase activity should mitigate the mispricing. Moreover, the price should increase
towards the ”true” value if the actual repurchases signal undervaluation. This should
further reduce the subsequent excess returns closer to expected levels for a portfolio of
these ﬁrms. In other words, we should observe a lower subsequent abnormal performance
for repurchasing ﬁrms if the initial repurchases are successful in reducing the mispricing.
In addition, we should also see a positive, and permanent price impact from the actual
repurchases if the market respond favorably to the information that the ﬁrm has executed
repurchases (this will be examined more closely in section 6.4).
Relative to what we expect to see for the group of non-repurchasing ﬁrms, this is
not clear. As discussed earlier, these ﬁrms may both choose to repurchase because they
are not mispriced which imply that these ﬁrms should perform as expected. Alternatively,
these ﬁrms may experience a price increase after the announcement such that the managers
choose not to repurchase any shares (Ikenberry et al., 2000), in which case we expect these
ﬁrms to show an abnormal performance if the price increase is related to new information.
Also, if these ﬁrms are undervalued after the announcement, but are unable to execute
repurchases due to e.g. liquidity constraints, we would also expect these ﬁrms to show an
long run abnormal performance if prices are adjusted in response to favorable information
arrivals in later periods. On the other hand, if these ﬁrms choose not to repurchase because
they are overvalued, we would expect these ﬁrms to underperform in the long run.
To examine these questions in more detail, we construct a portfolio through calendar
time in the similar fashion as we did when we examined the long term performance of
announcing ﬁrms in the previous section. However, instead of only selecting our portfolio
stocks conditional on whether the ﬁrm has announced a repurchase plan, we now also
condition our stock selection on whether a ﬁrm has executed its ﬁrst repurchase as well.
More speciﬁcally, we create two portfolios, assigning ﬁrms based on whether they have
repurchased shares in the previous period or not. In the ﬁrst portfolio (P1) we include
a ﬁrm the ﬁrst day of the month following the month when it announced a repurchase
plan (similar to the portfolio created in the previous section). Next, if a ﬁrm in P1
executes a repurchase, we remove the ﬁrm from P1 the following day and include it in a
second portfolio (P2) the ﬁrst day of the following month after it for the ﬁrst time has
executed a repurchase.42 Thus, P1 will at any point in time only contain ﬁrms that have
announced a repurchase plan, but not yet repurchased, while P2 contains ﬁrms that have
41The managers could also issue debt to ﬁnance the repurchases, but this may be costly if the ﬁrm
already have a high leverage ratio or that the undervaluation is to small to justify an issue of debt.
42Firms may execute several repurchases before it is included in P2. However, the potential price eﬀect
of these repurchases will not be included in either P1 or P2. Only the eﬀect of the ﬁrst repurchase will be
included in the return of P1.
31Table 8: Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity
The table shows the excess performance of two calendar time portfolios. P1 is the portfolio with announcing ﬁrms
that do not execute any repurchases, only announces. P2 is a portfolio of repurchasing ﬁrms where a ﬁrm is included
in the portfolio the month after it has executed its ﬁrst repurchase. The ﬁrm is excluded from P1 one day after it
has repurchased for the ﬁrst time. Thus, at any point in time, P1 consists of ﬁrms that has announced a repurchase
plan, but has not executed any repurchases, while P2 consists of ﬁrms that has executed at least one repurchase.
The excess returns on the two portfolios are estimated relative to a one-factor CAPM model (i), a three factor
Fama and French (1993) (ii) and a four factor Carhart (1997) model (iii),
(i) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εt
(ii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + εt
(iii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing ﬁrms, Rf





τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum
factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly as in eq. 3
and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return on the factor
portfolios. The table shows the results for buy-and-hold portfolios for which stocks are not sold (the stocks in the
portfolio are held through the entire sample from when they enter the portfolio). The estimated average daily excess
return, α, is reported in percent, and numbers in bold denote an α estimate signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
CAPM Fama/French Carhart
P1 (norep) P2 (rep) P1 (norep) P2 (rep) P1 (norep) P2 (rep)
α (%) 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.20
βm 0.58 0.56 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.73
βsmb 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.32
βhml 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06
βmom -0.08 0.03
adj.R2 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.45
Avg. ﬁrms 45 69 45 69 45 69
executed at least one repurchase following an announcement. The combined portfolio of
the ﬁrms in P1 and P2, is the portfolio that was analyzed in section 6.2, such that P1
and P2 represent a decomposition of the announcement portfolio.43 The fraction of ﬁrms
actually repurchasing and the fraction of outstanding shares actually repurchased among
Norwegian ﬁrms is reported in table 1. Thus, at the end of the sample period in the
scenario with no limit on the holding period, and we start the portfolio construction at
the beginning of the sample, we will be left with 63 ﬁrms in P1 and 100 ﬁrms in P2 at the
end of the sample period.
In table 8 we estimate the performance of the two portfolios relative to the CAPM,
Fama and French (1993) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model. On
average the portfolio of ﬁrms that has not repurchased, P1, consists of 45 ﬁrms while the
portfolio ﬁrms that execute at least one repurchase, P2, contains on average 69 ﬁrms. For
diversiﬁcation reasons, we do not start our portfolio construction before both portfolios
each contain at least 10 ﬁrms, which is in May 1999. Estimating Jensen’s alpha with
43One diﬀerence however, is that since ﬁrms are removed the day after they repurchase and not included
in P2 before the ﬁrst day of the next month, there is a window where a repurchasing ﬁrm is excluded from
both portfolios.
32respect to the CAPM, both portfolios show a signiﬁcant abnormal performance of 2%
(P1) and 1.6% (P2) per month. However, relative to the Fama/French and Carhart
speciﬁcations, the results indicate that P2 does not experience an abnormal performance
while P1 experience a signiﬁcant abnormal performance of about 1.2% per month. In other
words, the portfolio tracking the portfolio of repurchasing ﬁrms (after they have executed
their ﬁrst repurchases) perform as expected while the portfolio of ﬁrms that announces,
but do not repurchase, experience an excess performance.
This result may indicate that actual repurchases provide useful information to the
market which may be related to the conﬁrmation of the initial announcement signal,
permanently increasing the price such that mispricing is mitigated, and subsequent returns
are reduced to expected levels. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that these
ﬁrms do not repurchase shares for undervaluation reasons. In addition, the result may also
indicate that managers repurchase shares when their underperforms, such that the average
performance of this portfolio is lower than the portfolio where managers do not execute
any repurchases. We will examine the abnormal price impact of the actual repurchases
in the next section to investigate whether it is likely that the actual repurchases mitigate
mispricing.
Our results are also consistent with earlier ﬁndings. Stephens and Weisbach (1998)
ﬁnd, using quarterly repurchase data for Canada, that repurchases during one quarter ap-
pear to be negatively related to unadjusted returns in the previous (and contemporaneous)
quarter. This suggests that managers respond to previous price changes when determining
whether to repurchase or not. In addition, they ﬁnd that subsequent returns is lower in the
quarters after the ﬁrm has repurchased. This ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed in, Ikenberry et al.
(2000), using monthly repurchase data from Canada. In addition, Ikenberry et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that stock performance in the year following the announcement of a repurchase plan
decreases with the repurchase activity. They argue that this is because managers time
their repurchases to times when the ﬁrm is perceived by the manager of the ﬁrm as being
undervalued, such that these ﬁrms experience a lower excess performance on average.
This points to an issue that is not examined in the paper. The decision to repurchase is
likely to be related to events occurring after the announcement of the repurchase program,
such that the repurchases (or non repurchases) observed ex post were not necessarily
intended ex ante. This is an important and interesting issue since announcing ﬁrms are
likely to “self select” into being repurchasers or non-repurchasers. Furthermore, this may
explain the ﬁnding that repurchasing ﬁrms has a lower abnormal performance than non
repurchasing ﬁrms. It may be that ﬁrms choose not to repurchase because the price of their
stock has increased reﬂected by the abnormal performance of P1, while non-repurchasers
choose to repurchase because their stock has performed poorly. An interesting extension
would be to examine this self selection in more detail to study what are the important
decision variables that induce announcing ﬁrms to execute repurchases or not.
Since the results in table 8 are for the whole sample period for a buy-an-hold strategy,
we also check the robustness of our results by creating portfolios starting in diﬀerent years
as well as with various holding periods. The results from this analysis is reported in table
9. With respect to the diﬀerent starting years, the results are qualitatively the same as
in table 8, but quantitatively stronger in the later part of the sample. When we also
vary the holding period, we ﬁnd that the abnormal performance for P1 is signiﬁcant for
holding periods longer than one year. This is similar to the results when we examined the
performance for all ﬁrms in table 5.
So far we have not discussed in detail what may contribute to the abnormal perfor-
33Table 9: Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity - varying starting year
and holding period
The table shows the excess performance of two calendar time portfolios for varying starting years and holding
periods. P1 is the portfolio with announcing ﬁrms that do not execute any repurchases, only announces. P2 is a
portfolio of repurchasing ﬁrms where a ﬁrm is included in the portfolio the month after it has executed its ﬁrst
repurchase. Thus, at any point in time, P1 consists of ﬁrms that has announced a repurchase plan, but has not
executed any repurchases, while P2 consists of ﬁrms that has executed at least one repurchase. The excess returns
on the two portfolios are both measured relative to a four factor Carhart (1997) model,
Rpt − Rf
t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf
t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rpt is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing ﬁrms, Rf





τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum
factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly as in eq. 3
and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return on the factor
portfolios. The average daily excess return, α, is reported in percent, numbers in parentheses are p-values for the
α estimates, and numbers in bold represent a signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Year when starting portfolio construction
Max. 1999 2000 2001
holding
period α(P1) α(P2) α(P1) α(P2) α(P1) α(P2)
1 year 0.045 0.013 0.069 -0.007 0.134 0.028
(0.191) (0.727) (0.128) (0.86) (0.039) (0.655)
2 years 0.066 0.012 0.089 -0.006 0.121 0.017
(0.046) (0.658) (0.033) (0.832) (0.034) (0.665)
3 years 0.063 0.028 0.083 0.016 · ·
(0.036) (0.231) (0.027) (0.533) · ·
4 years 0.061 0.029 · · · ·
(0.025) (0.308) · · · ·
34Table 10: Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity - removing initial
repurchase in P1
The table shows the excess performance of two calendar time portfolios. P1 is the portfolio with announcing ﬁrms
that do not execute any repurchases, only announces. To examine whether the the eﬀect of the initial repurchase
contribute to the excess performance of P1, we exclude a ﬁrm ﬁve days before it executes its ﬁrst repurchase. P2
remains identical as in the previous analysis where ﬁrms are included in the ﬁrst day of the month after it has
executed its ﬁrst repurchase. Thus, at any point in time, P1 consists of ﬁrms that has announced a repurchase
plan, but has not executed any repurchases, while P2 consists of ﬁrms that has executed at least one repurchase.
The excess returns on the two portfolios are both measured relative to a one-factor CAPM model (i), a three factor
Fama and French (1993) (ii) and a four factor Carhart (1997) model (iii),
(i) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εt
(ii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + εt
(iii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing ﬁrms, Rf





τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum
factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly as in eq. 3
and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return on the factor
portfolios. The table shows the results for buy-and-hold portfolios for which stocks are not sold (the stocks in the
portfolio are held through the entire sample from when they enter the portfolio). The estimated average daily excess
return, α, is reported in percent, and numbers in bold denote an α estimate signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
CAPM Fama/French Carhart
P1 (norepo) P2 (repo) P1 (norepo) P2 (repo) P1 (norepo) P2 (repo)
α (%) 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.20
βm 0.58 0.56 0.68 0.72 0.66 0.73
βsmb 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.32
βhml 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06
βmom -0.08 0.03
adj.R2 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.45
Avg. ﬁrms 45 69 45 69 45 69
mance of P1. As discussed in the beginning of this section, the abnormal performance of
this portfolio may be due to several reasons. However, one issue that may aﬀect the excess
performance of P1 is that a stock is removed after it has repurchased shares for the ﬁrst
time after the announcement. If there is an strong abnormal price impact related to the
ﬁrst repurchase execution, this may aﬀect the performance of P1.
To examine to what degree this contributes to the abnormal performance of P1, we re-
estimate the models in table 8, but exclude each ﬁrm from P1 ﬁve days before it execute its
ﬁrst repurchase. Thus, the excess returns related to the initial repurchases should then not
be included in the performance of P1. The results from this analysis is reported in table
10, and it does not change the results greatly relative to the results in table 8. However,
the estimated alpha for P1 decreases slightly, as well as its p-value, but the alpha is still
signiﬁcant at the 5% level for P1. Thus, the initial repurchase seem to have an impact on
the performance of P1, but it does not explain the overall abnormal performance of P1.
An alternative reason for why ﬁrms choose not to repurchase shares may be that the
stock price increases such that the manager choose not to repurchase any shares (Ikenberry
35et al., 2000). This may clearly be a potential reason for why P1 experience a long term
abnormal performance. However, another explanation for why these ﬁrms do not execute
any repurchases may be that the ﬁrms do not have any cash available to repurchase shares.
Thus, if these ﬁrms experience an underreaction when they announce the repurchase plan,
such that they are undervalued after the announcement, it may be that they are unable to
signal to the market that they are mispriced through actual repurchases due to liquidity
constraints. Moreover, given that the market underreacts to the signal conveyed through
the initial announcement, and the ﬁrm is undervalued after the announcement, the lack
of repurchase activity keeps the price at a low level, resulting in abnormal returns when
the market is faced with positive information surprises in later periods.
To examine more closely whether low liquidity is a likely reason for why ﬁrms do
not repurchase, we examine measures of liquidity from accounting data. The liquidity
measures we use are the most recently reported quick ratios and current ratios prior to
the announcements of the repurchase plans. The current ratio is calculated as the total
short-term assets divided by total short-term debt, and the quick ratio is calculated as
the sum of cash and deposits, total short-term ﬁnancial investments and total short-term
receivables divided by total short-term debt. In table 11 we examine the diﬀerence in
liquidity between the ﬁrms in the two groups. The “no repurchase” group contains ﬁrms
that do not repurchase shares during the sample (the ﬁrms in portfolio P1 in the above
analysis). The ﬁrst column of the table also contain the average liquidity measure for all
ﬁrms listed at the OSE.44 The results suggests that non-repurchasing ﬁrms are on average
signiﬁcantly less liquid than repurchasing ﬁrms. Although this varies somewhat across the
years, the overall diﬀerence in liquidity between non-repurchasing and repurchasing ﬁrms
support a hypothesis that at least some announcing ﬁrms do not execute repurchases due
to lack of liquidity. Furthermore, it also substantiates our story that since these ﬁrms are
constrained from repurchasing, and more credibly signal undervaluation, they experience
a long-term abnormal drift due to e.g. information surprises in later periods.
To summarize, the results in this section indicates that the long term abnormal per-
formance experienced by ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan, mainly is due to ﬁrms
that do not repurchase shares (P1). These results does not provide an explanation for
the underreaction hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995). However, it oﬀers an
alternative interpretation in that the market rationally underreacts at the announcement
date due to the low credibility of the signal. If a ﬁrm actually executes a repurchase,
this may be a stronger signal of undervaluation, such that the market price is increased
and the subsequent performance is reduced to expected levels. With respect to why the
ﬁrms that do not repurchase experience a long term abnormal performance, we propose
several explanations. This may be because these ﬁrms experience a price increase after the
announcement reﬂected in the excess performance for this group, such that the manger
chooses not to execute any repurchases. An additional interpretation, may be that these
ﬁrms are unable to signal undervaluation, such that they on average experience a positive
drift when positive information about the ﬁrms are announced in later periods.
44Before averaging across all the ﬁrms, we ﬁlter away the extreme observations in the upper 99% per-
centile. This removes 6 observations (within diﬀerent years) with the largest having a quick ratio of more
than 1000.
36Table 11: Liquidity diﬀerence
The table shows the average liquidity of ﬁrms announcing a repurchase plan conditional on whether they execute
repurchases for the duration of the repurchase plan or not. Results are supplied for the whole sample (All years) as
well as for announcements occurring within separate years. The ﬁrst column report the average across all ﬁrms at
the OSE. The proxies used to measure liquidity are the ”current ratio” calculated as total short-term assets divided
by total short-term debt, and the ”quick ratio” calculated as the sum of cash and deposits, total short-term ﬁnancial
investments and total short-term receivables divided by total short-term debt. The liquidity measure is the most
recently reported by the ﬁrm before it announces the repurchase plan. We perform t-tests for diﬀerences in means
between ﬁrms that announce a repurchase plan but do not repurchase (1) and ﬁrms that execute repurchases (2).
The ﬁrst test is a one sided test with the null that non-repurchasing ﬁrms has a higher or equal liquidity to ﬁrms
that repurchase. The second test is a two sided test with the null hypothesis that the two means are equal. The
p-values are adjusted conditional on whether the variance of the two distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the
5% level or not.
All
OSE ﬁrms No repurchase (1) Repurchase (2) Test for diﬀerence in means
Mean Mean Std.err N Mean Std.err N (2) <= (1) (1) = (2)
p-value p-value
Quick ratio
All years 2.32 1.66 0.14 63 2.47 0.24 100 <0.01 <0.01
1998 2.48 1.97 0.38 13 1.91 0.31 15 0.54 0.91
1999 2.31 1.55 0.22 44 2.23 0.31 41 0.04 0.08
2000 2.36 1.41 0.18 25 2.88 0.43 65 <0.01 <0.01
2001 2.14 1.84 0.31 49 2.37 0.49 60 0.18 0.37
Current ratio
All years 2.65 1.98 0.14 63 2.72 0.23 100 <0.01 0.01
1998 2.96 2.31 0.35 13 2.10 0.29 15 0.68 0.63
1999 2.62 1.86 0.21 44 2.56 0.21 41 0.03 0.05
2000 2.63 1.74 0.22 25 3.13 0.42 65 <0.01 <0.01
2001 2.36 2.16 0.33 49 2.58 0.49 60 0.24 0.47
376.4 The timing and price impact of the actual repurchases
In the previous sections we found evidence that the market on average underreacted to the
announcement of a repurchase plan, suggesting that the information in the initial signal
was slowly incorporated into prices over time. In addition, we found that the apparent
underreaction seemed to be mainly related to ﬁrms that announced a repurchase plan,
but did not execute any repurchases during the course of the plan.
In this section we look closer at the short term eﬀect in the days surrounding the actual
repurchases. Moreover, we examine whether and to what degree the actual repurchases
are interpreted by the market as informative to the value of the ﬁrm. If the repurchase is
interpreted as a valuable positive signal, we should observe on average a positive abnormal
return on the repurchase date, and that there is no reversal in the CAR after the repur-
chase. This would be in line with our interpretation of the results in the previous section
that the repurchases mitigate mispricing. Alternatively, an eﬀect from the repurchase may
also be related to trading activity of the ﬁrm, in which case we would expect to see only
a temporary eﬀect.
Initially, in the extreme case where undervaluation is the only motive for why a ﬁrm
announces a repurchase plan, undervaluation should also be the main motivation for why
ﬁrms actually execute repurchases. However, as discussed in Ikenberry et al. (2000), the
manager may also repurchase because he perceives the ﬁrm to be undervalued after large
price declines. Relative to the initial announcement, the actual repurchases reﬂect real
transactions and may be more credible signals to the market than the announcement of the
plan when there is no commitment to repurchase. Furthermore, when a ﬁrm announces a
repurchase plan, this may not be related to the ﬁrm being undervalued at the time, but
rather to give the managers the ﬂexibility to exploit windows of opportunity some point
in the future. Thus, examining the price impact of the actual repurchases may give us
more information about whether undervaluation is a potential explanation for why ﬁrms
repurchase shares and how the market react to the actual repurchase. If managers suc-
cessfully identify when the ﬁrm is undervalued, one would expect their timing to coincide
with a preceding negative drift in abnormal returns. Results in Ikenberry et al. (2000)
suggest that this is the case, but are unable to examine the pattern in excess return around
the repurchase date since they only have monthly repurchase aggregates. However, their
results indicate that ﬁrms repurchase more in periods when the stock price falls.
To examine the eﬀect of actual share repurchases, we apply a similar event study
methodology to the one used in section 6.1, and use the actual repurchase announcement
date as the event. This date is either the same day as the repurchase or before the trading
session starts the next day. One main problem with analyzing the actual repurchases
is that there are about 1375 repurchase events over a 4 year period. Since ﬁrms often
repurchase shares on several days in a row, this clustering of events is problematic in
several respects. First of all, if a ﬁrm execute several repurchases in sequence, the event
dates will be overlapping and dependent. This results in the post and pre-event excess
returns being averaged across overlapping periods. Thus, if ﬁrms repurchase when there is
a negative drift in excess returns, the average negative excess return will be exaggerated.
Figure 2 shows the average cumulative abnormal returns from 50 days before to 50 days
after the repurchase when we ignore these problems and use all 1375 repurchase events.
Although the numbers used in the ﬁgure are subject to several problems related to the
clustering of events, and that ﬁrms that repurchase more gain a larger weight, it illustrates
that repurchases are executed in periods when the stock experience a downward drift
38Figure 2: CAR around actual repurchases - unﬁltered
The ﬁgure shows the CAR from 50 days before the actual repurchase until 50 days after the repurchase. In the
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in abnormal performance. In addition, there seem to be a temporary increase in the
stock price around the repurchases date. Thus, the normal performance of the repurchase
portfolio (P2) in the previous section, may be because these ﬁrms perform worse on average
than non-repurchasing ﬁrms in (P1).
To reduce the bias related to the clustering of repurchases discussed above, we calculate
short term excess returns for two main cases. First, for each ﬁrm, we restrict repurchases
to be 40 days apart to be included in the sample. Although this reduces the bias related
to overlapping, the excess returns both before and after the repurchase contain potential
abnormal price movements related to repurchases that are not included in the sample, but
are still reﬂected in the returns. We also examine excess returns surrounding only the ﬁrst
repurchase executed by a ﬁrm, leaving us with 100 repurchase events. The results from
this analysis is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. In both cases, there seem to be a negative drift in
CAR prior to the repurchase and a price impact on the event date. However, pre event
CAR is not signiﬁcant at any conventional levels. The most important thing to note is that
the price impact is permanent, in the sense that there is no reversal in CAR at least 20
days after the repurchase. If the impact was mainly a liquidity eﬀect, we would expect to
see a reversal in the day after the actual repurchase. Thus, the abnormal permanent price
impact is in line with the market interpreting the repurchase as a positive signal and/or
a conﬁrmation of the initial announcement of the repurchase plan. This support our
interpretation of the results in the section 6.3, in the sense that repurchases permanently
increase prices, and mitigate the undervaluation.
One concern with the argument in section 6.3 is that many of the ﬁrms that have exe-
cuted their ﬁrst repurchase, execute several repurchases. In fact 81% of the ﬁrms execute
two repurchases, and 26% of the ﬁrms execute 10 repurchases. Thus, if each repurchase
has an impact on excess returns, we would expect to see an abnormal performance related
to these subsequent repurchases which should create a positive drift in the repurchase
portfolio (P2). On the other hand, it may be that most of the signalling value of the
39Figure 3: CAR around actual repurchases - ﬁltered
The ﬁgure shows the CAR from 20 days before the ﬁrm announces that it has repurchased until 20 days after the
announcement, when we restrict repurchases not to be within 40 trading days of each other (40 day ﬁlter) and when















repurchase activity is related to the ﬁrst repurchase conducted by a ﬁrm, since it conveys
to the market that the ﬁrm is committed to actually repurchasing shares. If so, most of
the price correction occurs before the stock is included in the second portfolio (P2), such
that the subsequent performance is not aﬀected by the continuing repurchase activity. To
examine this in more detail we estimate the CAR for the three day period surrounding the
actual repurchase, from τ1=-1 (when the ﬁrm actually execute the repurchase), through
τ2=1 (one day after the ﬁrm has announced that it has repurchased). We do this for each
n’th repurchase event. In table 12 ”Repurchase number” denotes the sequence number of
the repurchase. Thus, 100 ﬁrms executed one repurchase, 81 ﬁrms execute a second re-
purchase etc. For each subsequent repurchase event we report the percentage CAR for the
event window, the standard deviation of the CARs related to the event and the associated
t-value. As opposed to the event study in section 6.1 where we estimated the variance for
the excess returns prior to the event, we use the event window standard deviation when we
examine the abnormal returns related to actual repurchases. This estimator of the vari-
ance takes into account the possibility that the event itself increases the risk of the ﬁrm, as
suggested in Campbell et al. (1997). In addition, the two last columns of the table shows
the average fraction that ﬁrms repurchase during the n’th repurchase, both with respect
to the total number of shares they repurchase in the program as well as as a percentage of
outstanding shares. The results in the table indicate that the ﬁrst repurchase executed by
ﬁrms has the greatest price impact of about 0.88% which is highly signiﬁcant. This may
suggests that the ﬁrst repurchase contains the most value to the market. After the ﬁrst
repurchase there seem to be a decrease in the eﬀect from the subsequent repurchases.
It is also interesting to note that ﬁrms on average repurchase about 38% of their total
repurchase amount during their ﬁrst repurchase. This is also evident when looking at
the repurchase volume as a fraction of outstanding shares, with about 1.1% of the ﬁrm
40Table 12: CAR for subsequent repurchase events
The table shows the average cumulative abnormal return from τ1=-1 to τ2=1 for the 15 ﬁrst repurchases executed
by ﬁrms. The ﬁrst column (”Repurchase number”) denotes whether it is the ﬁrst, second, third etc. repurchase
executed by the sample ﬁrms. Thus, we see from the table that 100 ﬁrms executed one repurchase, 81 ﬁrms executed
a second repurchase, 66 ﬁrms executed a third repurchase and so on. %CAR(τ1,τ2), is the average CAR around the
n’th repurchase executed by ﬁrms. The table also report the t-value from a test that the CAR is equal to zero, the
average fraction of the total volume repurchased by ﬁrms in the n’th repurchase and the average% of outstanding
shares repurchase by ﬁrms in the n’th repurchase.
Repurchase %CAR avg.fraction
number Firms (τ1,τ2) std.dev t-value of rep.vol of outs. shares
1 100 0.877 0.023 3.83 38.1% 1.1%
2 81 0.388 0.021 1.69 16.1% 0.6%
3 66 0.398 0.018 1.77 13.1% 0.7%
4 65 0.045 0.017 0.22 11.6% 0.5%
5 54 0.012 0.015 0.06 8.7% 0.6%
6 51 0.449 0.021 1.55 8.0% 0.6%
7 41 0.298 0.019 1.00 6.6% 0.6%
8 38 0.599 0.020 1.84 6.9% 0.7%
9 33 0.218 0.018 0.68 3.1% 0.2%
10 26 -0.051 0.017 -0.16 3.9% 0.3%
11 22 0.365 0.023 0.75 2.8% 0.3%
12 22 0.186 0.021 0.42 3.8% 0.4%
13 18 0.154 0.043 0.15 3.8% 0.8%
14 16 -0.116 0.014 -0.33 6.0% 0.7%
15 15 -0.129 0.019 -0.26 4.4% 0.4%
shares bought back during the initial repurchase. Thus, the largest impact from the initial
repurchase may be due to a liquidity eﬀect. On the other hand, a larger average volume
may also be perceived as a stronger signal in the market. From ﬁgure 3 there is no
evidence of reversal, but rather that the CAR is relatively stable in the 20 days following
the repurchase.
Overall it seems like the actual repurchases are greeted by the market as a positive
signal, and that the ﬁrst repurchase executed by ﬁrms is perceived as the most valuable
signal.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines a sample of announcements of repurchase plans and actual repur-
chases by Norwegian ﬁrms in the period 1998 through 2001. In addition to providing
evidence on open market share repurchases in a market where repurchases recently has
been allowed, we believe that repurchases in Norway are particularly interesting to study
because of the legal requirement that ﬁrms report their repurchase activity on a daily
basis. By exploiting these unique data, we improve the understanding of repurchases, and
how the market reacts to the actual repurchase executions.
Even during this short period, repurchases has become an important tool for Norwe-
gian ﬁrms. With respect to the actual repurchase activity of Norwegian ﬁrms, we ﬁnd
that about 60% of the ﬁrms that announces a repurchase plan execute at least one repur-
chase during the repurchase period authorized by the shareholders. In addition, the cash
distributed through repurchases as a fraction of dividends was 25% in 1999 and 44% in
2000 and 2001. Furthermore, these ﬁrms repurchased on average 2.9% of their outstanding
41Figure 4: CAR for subsequent repurchase events














































































































































shares during the repurchase period.
We ﬁnd support for the underreaction hypothesis investigated in Ikenberry et al. (1995)
also in Norwegian data. The excess performance around the announcement of a repurchase
plan is on average about 2.5%, while a calender time portfolio of the same ﬁrms experience
a signiﬁcant long term excess performance of about 0.9% per month, or about 11% a year,
relative to a Fama and French (1993) three factor model speciﬁcation. Thus, although
the market puts a positive value on the signal conveyed through the announcement, this
indicate that it is not completely and immediately incorporated into prices.
In the long run, when creating two portfolios of ﬁrms that have announced a repurchase
plan and condition the portfolio construction on whether the ﬁrm actually execute any
repurchases, we ﬁnd that the portfolio consisting only of announcing ﬁrms that has not yet
repurchased show a signiﬁcant excess performance of about 1.2% per month. The portfolio
of ﬁrms that actually execute repurchases does not experience a signiﬁcant abnormal
performance. We interpret this as the market assessing the actual repurchases as a valuable
signal, increasing the stock price and aligning the subsequent long term returns to expected
levels.
For the ﬁrms that do not repurchase, we argue that their excess performance may be
related to several issues. First, it may be that these ﬁrms do not repurchase simply because
their stock price increases after the announcement such that the manager no longer assess
the ﬁrm as being undervalued. However, an additional explanation may be that these
ﬁrms are restricted from repurchasing due to liquidity reasons. And by being unable to
signal undervaluation to the market through real transactions, their stock price experience
excess performance as the information is conveyed through positive information surprises
in later periods. Consistent with this interpretation we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that do not execute
any repurchases are less liquid than ﬁrms that actually execute repurchases.
When examining in more detail the timing and price impact around the actual repur-
chase executions, we ﬁnd that there is a negative drift in excess returns during the 20
42days prior to the actual repurchase. This suggests that managers execute repurchases in
periods when the stock underperforms relative to several model speciﬁcations for expected
returns. When examining the market impact of the repurchases itself, we ﬁnd that there
is a signiﬁcant excess return on the day when the ﬁrm execute the repurchase. In the
period after the repurchase, there is no reversal in excess returns suggesting that market
puts a positive value on the signal that the ﬁrm has actually repurchased shares.
Overall, our ﬁndings oﬀer additional evidence for the underreaction hypothesis. Over-
all, the market seem to underreact to the initial announcement. However, the abnormal
performance of announcing ﬁrms is to a large degree driven by ﬁrms that are unable to ex-
ecute repurchases. If these ﬁrms are still undervalued after the announcement, and unable
to signal undervaluation due to liquidity constraints, the price remains too. This result
indicate that requiring repurchasing ﬁrms to announce their repurchases immediately may
help improve price discovery.
43A Robustness check for announcement eﬀect
To check that the results in table 3 in section 6.1 are aﬀected by extreme observations,
ﬁrms with CARs below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile are removed from
the sample. Table 13 shows the results from this analysis. Truncating the sample reduces
the average announcement CAR to about 1.9% for the Carhart speciﬁcation.
Table 13: Abnormal returns around announcements of repurchase plans - a robustness
check
The table shows the abnormal return (in percent) around announcements of repurchase plans when the 5% lowest
and 5% highest CARs are removed from the sample. The abnormal return is measured relative to a one factor
market model (unadjusted and adjusted for biases induced by infrequent trading as proposed in Dimson (1979)
and Scholes and Williams (1977)), Fama and French (1993) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor
model, with the value weighted OSE general index as the market portfolio. The sub-sample regressions and the
repurchase% regressions are cumulative excess returns relative to the Carhart four factor model. Numbers in bold
represent numbers signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, and numbers in parenthesis are the associated
t-values.
Days relative to announcement date
n -20 to -3 -2 to +2 +3 to +20
Whole sample regressions
Unadjusted market model 286 -0.56 (-1.20) 1.845 (4.39) 0.51 (0.62)
Dimson(1979) 286 -0.32 (-0.67) 1.806 (4.21) 0.00 (0.01)
Scholes/Williams(1977) 286 -0.51 (-1.08) 1.807 (4.23) -0.12 (-0.21)
Fama/French 3 factor model 286 -0.74 (-1.54) 1.814 (4.28) 0.16 (0.29)
Carhart 4 factor model 286 -0.60 (-1.27) 1.901 (4.44) 0.14 (0.26)
Subsample regression (year)
1998 25 1.61 (1.18) 1.360 (0.74) 1.12 (0.86)
1999 77 -0.59 (-0.69) 2.198 (2.82) 1.46 (1.19)
2000 83 -1.55 (-1.62) 1.042 (1.30) -0.17 (-0.17)
2001 101 -0.37 (-0.47) 2.515 (3.62) -0.87 (-0.96)
Max.repudchase %
<0%-5%] 23 -4.27 (-2.08) 4.235 (1.00) -1.80 (-0.67)
<5%-10%] 263 -0.33 (-0.69) 1.893 (4.48) 0.24 (0.41)
44B Additional data for the sale of treasury stock
The paper only examines the gross repurchase activity by ﬁrms. However, the dataset
also contains the sale of repurchased shares (treasury stock). Table 14 shows aggregate
statistics for both repurchases as well as for the sale of treasury stock (“reverse repur-
chases”). The reduction in treasury stock may be due to e.g. sales of shares in the open
market, as payment in various transactions, management/employee option exercises, stock
bonuses, stock dividends or that the treasury stock is retired. As can be seen from the
table, there are almost six times as many repurchase executions as sales, and the number
of repurchased shares are more than twice of what was sold. However, the size of the
repurchases are on average about 1/3 of the amount that was sold. This indicate that
ﬁrms aggregate treasury stock through many smaller repurchases, and reduce treasury
stock in much larger volumes.
Table 14: Aggregate statistics for repurchases and sale of treasury stock
The table shows aggregate statistics for both stock repurchases as well as for “reverse” repurchases (sale of treasury
stock). The table shows the number of transactions, the total number of shares traded and the average size of the
transactions for repurchases and sales during the period from 1999 to 2002. The last part of the table shows the
fraction of buys to sales.
Size of
Number of Shares transactions
transactions (mill.) (1000 shares)
Repurchases
Whole period 1719 247.2 143.8
1999 205 35.3 172.2
2000 463 64.6 139.5
2001 659 107.4 163.0
2002 392 40.6 103.5
Sales
Whole period 293 109.4 373.5
1999 19 2.8 145.0
2000 68 26.2 385.0
2001 105 40.6 386.9
2002 101 39.9 394.9
Fraction of buys/sales
Whole period 5.87 2.26 0.38
1999 10.79 12.82 1.19
2000 6.81 2.47 0.36
2001 6.28 2.64 0.42
2002 3.88 1.02 0.26
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